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After the all-time low voter turnout in the European elections in 2014, the European Parliament faces its legitimacy 
being undermined. While the mass media is often made responsible for being a major contributor to the lack of an 
active political European public sphere where the EU governance can be debated, social media has been considered 
as a means to connect the European institutions and its citizens through direct communication. From the viewpoint of 
deliberative democratic theory, the European Parliament can restore legitimacy through engaging citizens in public 
deliberation and involving them in the European decision-making process. At the same time, political institutions are 
known for their attempts to generate legitimacy in social media through promotional campaigns that do not stipulate 
policy impact.	
This study contributes to the debate about the European public sphere by exploring the motivations behind the Euro-
pean Parliament’s institutional communication on the social networking site Facebook. Its theoretical underpin-
ning hence links together the debates about the EU’s democratic deficit on the one hand, and the democratic poten-
tial of social media on the other. Specifically, this research scrutinises how the members of the European Parliament’s 
Web Communication unit make sense of their work practices on Facebook and which role they ascribe to themselves 
and other actors in the construction of a European public sphere. The goal is to offer a critical assessment of the 
European Parliament’s Facebook communication against the backdrop of the normative framework derived from the 
deliberative theory of public sphere.	
The qualitative research is based on two data sets: The first data set was collected through participant observation in 
the European Parliament’s Web Communication unit in February 2018; the second one through eight semi-struc-
tured interviews with the Unit’s communication officials working with Facebook. Based on positioning theory, an inter-
pretative interview analysis is conducted. 	
The findings assert that the European Parliament’s Facebook communication must be understood as a political, top-
down, promotional campaign rather than an attempt to engage ordinary citizens in an online deliberation. Thus, it does 
not provide for a systematic political bottom-up policy impact. The findings hence support the view that the narrative 
of social media connecting political actors and the citizens is most of all put forward to legitimise political promotion. 
This study moreover emphasises a liberal representative understanding rather than a deliberative understanding of 
European democracy within the European Parliament’s administration. Accordingly, the role of the European Parlia-
ment web communication officials in the European public sphere is to substitute the weak media coverage about the 
Parliament and raise awareness about its benefits to the voters.  	
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1. Introduction  
With the turnout in the European elections reaching an all-time low of under 43 percent in 
2014, the legitimacy of the European Parliament (EP) is increasingly threatened. It is evident 
that the EP will need to increase its efforts to mobilise citizens to participate in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections in May 2019. From the viewpoint of the deliberative democratic the-
ory, this can be achieved through involving the citizens of the European Union in a public 
discussion about the EU in general and the EP in particular. 
Facebook and other social media have created a new paradigm which allows large scale, direct 
interaction between political institutions and citizens (Van Dijk 2013). In the case of Europe, 
they moreover provide for a geographically unbound discussion board for citizen from all over 
EU (Meriläinen & Vos 2010, 2). As such, social media potentially offers an online space for 
European citizens to control the EP and the EP to prove its legitimacy (Hepp, Brüggemann, 
Kleinen-von-Königslöw, Lingenberg & Möller 2012, 65). Previous research has shown that 
the amount of news coverage about the EP in mass media is low, despite the professionalisation 
of the institutions’ press work (Laursen & Valentini 2014, 2; Meyer 2009, 1060). 
Social media offers a window of opportunity for the EP to address its lack of legitimacy and 
engage the citizens in a public online deliberation about European issues. However, social me-
dia communication bypasses journalistic scrutiny, gives the institution complete editorial con-
trol over the published content and allows them to issue promotional campaigns that put for-
ward a strategic narrative to justify its executive actions (Price 2012, 11). There are different 
views on whether the professionalised communication of political institutions can go hand in 
hand with democratic deliberation. Some authors as well as professional of the promotional 
industries argue that communication tailored to appeal to a target audience can increase the 
interest in politics. Others warn that social media has become a tool for institutional image 
management, replacing critical news coverage with one-sided promotion (Davis 2013, 
21ff). Deliberation, on the other hand, necessarily includes that the communication between a 
political actor and citizens influences the political decision-making (Ivic 2017, 83).  
In this study, I aim to explore the relationship of EP’s institutional online communication strat-
egy on the social networking site Facebook to the European public sphere. The institutional 
communication on Facebook is understood here as “the top-down process of the unmediated, 




(Michailidou 2007, 1). The European public sphere is understood as the “communicative in-
frastructure used for debating the legitimacy of the project of European integration” (Trenz 
2009, 35). This study’s theoretical underpinning hence combines two academic debates: one 
about the democratic deficit in the EU, which can be explained with a lack of European public 
sphere, and one about the democratic potential of social media communication.  
To investigate the deliberative potential of the EP’s Facebook communication strategy, it is 
crucial to consider the conditions under which it is produced as well as the subjective views of 
the European communication officials who can provide information about the meaning of and 
motivation behind the communication (Aagaard 2016, 2; Martins et al. 2012, 308). This study 
is hence based on two data sets: The first set consists of field notes from a two week long 
participant observation in the Web Communication unit at the EP’s Directorate-General for 
Communication in February 2018. The second one entails eight semi-structured interviews 
with EP web communication officials working with Facebook, including the Head of Unit, 
conducted during the same period of time. It is assumed that the combination of both data sets 
adds value to the study because it contributes to the interpretation and contextualisation of its 
findings. The data was collected more than one year before the upcoming European elections 
in May 2019 and therefore describes ordinary events. 
As a method, a qualitative analysis based on the positioning theory will be conducted (Harré 
& Maghaddam 2003; James 2011). In particular, I will look at which role the EP communica-
tion officials claim in the construction of a European public sphere by investigating how they 
position themselves in relation to the EU citizens, the media, politicians as well as the company 
Facebook. Thereby, I will pay special attention to the narratives the officials use to legitimise 
the claimed role and their working practices on Facebook. Based on this analysis, I will criti-
cally evaluate the EP’s communication’s value for the European public sphere. The research 
questions to be answered in this study are thus:  
RQ: How do the members of the EP’s Web Communication unit make sense of the institutional 
communication on the official EP Facebook?  
SRQ: How do the members of the EP’s Web Communication unit perceive their own role from 
the perspective of the European public sphere?  
The goal of the study is to offer a critical evaluation of the EP’s approach to social media com-




institutions are seeking in creating a European public sphere. Research, taking into account the 
institutional perspective, is crucial because knowledge about the political impact of the EU’s 
online dialogues is still vague (Hennen 2016, 40). Studies about the EP’s approach to commu-
nication are moreover important as most of the scholarly attention has gone to the institutional 
communication of the Council of the EU respectively the Council of Ministers or the European 
Commission (Laursen & Valentini 2014, 2). At the same time, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) has 
increased the power of the EP. As a result, the institution faces higher normative expectations 
towards its role as a democratic legislator than the other EU institutions (Stie 2013, 1f). Finally, 
European public sphere research often concentrates on communication at election times. The 
consequence is a lack of knowledge about ordinary institutional communication (Gattermann 
2013, 437). The study of ordinary events is however important because, from the perspective 
of deliberation democracy, public deliberation guiding governance decisions should be an on-
going procedure while European elections take place only every five years.  
The study’s structure is the following: Because the research draws on different topical debates, 
the first three chapters will deal with literature that informed the research’s theoretical back-
grounds. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), the deliberative theory of public sphere and different 
models of a European public sphere that built up on this normative theory are presented. By 
showing findings about the coverage of the EU in the mass media, the chapter also sheds light 
on current deficiencies in the deliberative European pubic sphere. Chapter 3 looks at the rela-
tion between new online media and democracy as well as how social media has changed the 
public discourse. It also deals with the social media communication of political institutions, 
which is often promotional. In this chapter, the institutional communication of the EP is also 
described. Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this study. Subsequently, Chapter 5 
presents the findings of the qualitative interviews with the EP communication officials and 
critically discusses the findings from the perspective of the deliberative theory of democracy. 
In the final chapter (Chapter 6), the main results of the analysis are summarised and an outlook 






2.  The European Public Sphere 
Worldwide, the European Union is often considered as a political success story: By constituting 
a globally sui generis, non-statist political system with 28 member states (Laffan 2004, 75), it 
has created significant peace and wealth on the previously war-torn European continent. In 
2012, it was rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for its contributions of transforming formerly 
autocratic states into liberal democracies and defending human rights.  
Yet inside the EU, the situation looks different: The public support for the European integra-
tion, which involves the gradual transfer of national sovereign rights to the supranational level 
(Börzel & Risse 2009, 217f), is low. After popular votes in Denmark (1992), France (2005) 
and the Netherlands (2005) had slowed down further integration, the term “constraining dis-
sensus” (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 5) has been coined. It pits the pro-European elites who profit 
from the economic growth and job creation against the citizens who struggle to understand how 
the opaque and complex decision-making on a European level benefits them (Gaxie 2011, 15f). 
Facing weak public support, the EU institutions have reacted with an institutional reform de-
signed to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) recognised 
citizens as the only source of power and legitimacy in the EU and strengthened the European 
Parliament’s role in legislative process (Weidenfeld & Wessels 2009, 357f). Despite of the aim 
to strengthen citizen participation in the EU politics, the voter turnout in the European elections 
has been constantly decreasing: from 62% in 1979 to 42,6% in 2014.1 In autumn 2018, only 
49% of the European citizens believes that their voice counts in the EU. 47% believe it does 
not, which is 20 percent points less than in 2013 (Standard Eurobarometer 90, 11). The “crisis 
of representative democracy” (Davis 2013, 136) seems to have thus escalated at the EU level. 
 
2.1. The European Union’s democratic deficit from a deliberative perspective 
Amongst scholars, political commentators and EU officials alike, the existence of a “demo-
cratic deficit” in the European polity is widely recognised (Moravcsik 2004, 348).2 Because in 
political theory democracy generally refers to the rule of the people (Karppinen 2013, 1), the 
                                               
1 European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections. Retrieved December 2, 2018 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html 






term refers to a lack of political legitimacy and accountability of the EU institutions (Vesnic-
Alujevic & Nacarino 2012, 63f).3 For a political institution, legitimacy means “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 
1995, 574). According to Dahlgren (2015, 6), the EU’s legitimacy deficit “derives from the 
inadequate democratic anchoring” and is hence a result of the democratic deficit.  
There are different approaches in the social sciences to explain the deficiencies that occur in 
the EU’s democracy (Biebricher & Vogelmann 2014, 2). While the institutional scholarship 
scrutinises deficiencies in the EU’s institutional architecture, constructivist scholarship asserts 
that the EU’s problems are located in the social realm (Schmidt 2012, 4). Constructivists argue 
that the EU people need to move away from the “social and cultural persistence of the nation 
state” (Hennen 2016, 21) in order for a European democracy coming into being. From this 
perspective, knowledge and culture is socially constructed through communication. Therefore, 
much constructivist research on the EU’s democracy focuses on the public sphere.  
The public sphere “can be defined as a communication system that mediates between the citi-
zens at the micro-level and the governmental system at the macrolevel” (Walter 2017, 751). 
Public sphere theories are closely related to democratic theory, which regards a mediating 
sphere between government and constituency as a central characteristic of democratic systems 
(ibid, 749). While “[d]emocratic theory focuses on accountability and responsiveness in the 
decision-making process; theories of the public sphere focus on the role of public communica-
tion in facilitating or hindering this process” (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards & Rucht, 2002, 289).  
Different traditions in democratic theory postulate different theories of democratic public 
sphere according to their normative underpinnings (Ferree et al. 2002, 289f). The liberal or 
representative democratic theory evaluates democratic systems based on the political repre-
sentation of attitudes, values and interests in society (Stie 2013, 4f). Its most important feature 
are hence elections. Thus, in the vote-centric representative democratic theory the public 
sphere’s central function is to provide information and transparency about governmental ac-
tion. Political representatives, experts and the media are supposed to make this information 
available in order for the citizens to make a rational choice at election time. In the representa-
tive theoretical tradition, the citizens are hence not supposed to participate in the public 
                                               
3 With its underlying concepts having changed over time, the term democratic deficit has not been 




discourse (ibid; Ferree et al. 2002, 290f). The poststructuralist democratic theoretical tradition 
entertains a more inclusive notion of the public sphere. Poststructuralists see the public sphere 
as a space for the struggle for power between multiple groups with irreconcilable differences 
in values and attitudes (ibid, 314ff).  
Most studies on the European public sphere have built upon deliberative democratic theories 
(Walter 2017, 750). It sees the public will formation through rational deliberation preceding 
the vote as being essential for finding a societal consensus that legitimises democratic govern-
ance (Ferree et al. 2002, 300ff). A central characteristic of talk-centric deliberative theories is 
the popular inclusion: The public sphere should entail the voices of actors from the political 
landscape’s periphery such as small parties, NGOs, interest associations and civil society actors 
(ibid, 300; Stie 2013, 4). According to this view, the communication deficit, because of a lack 
of a public deliberation of EU policies, is a central part of the EU’s democracy (Meyer 1999). 
In the following section, I first explain the deliberative model of the public sphere and why it 
offers, despite its critique, a useful normative framework to analyse the European public 
sphere. Secondly, I present how the deliberative model has been applied on the transnational 
level to conceptualise the European public sphere as a patchwork of media coverage. Conse-
quently, I discuss how a deliberative network approach is best suited to capture communication 
taking place online as part of the European public sphere. 
 
2.1.1. The deliberative model of democratic public sphere  
The deliberate notion of the democratic public sphere has been strongly influenced by German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ popular works “The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere” (1962) and “The Theory of Communicative Action” (1981) (Salovaara-Moring 2009, 
11; Dahlberg 2013, 3). Even though Habermas’ normative theory has been the subject to a vast 
range of critique (Calhoun 1992), it is acknowledged that its normative criteria serve an im-
portant heuristic function in the evaluation of media performance (Karppinen 2013, 3). It has 
also informed a majority of present European public sphere scholarship (Walter 2017, 750). 
The central argument of deliberative theorists adhering to the Habermasian approach is that the 
legitimation of democratic governance is created through public deliberation (Ferree et al. 
2002, 300f). In contrast to the representative democratic theory, the deliberate theory pays at-




function, normative criteria are central to the theory (Ferree et al. 2002, 301). The term public 
sphere, translated from the German original Öffentlichkeit, has hence two meanings: First, from 
a sociological perspective, it simply describes the public deliberation and the communicative 
space it is taking place in (Dahlberg 2013, 4). Secondly, from a normative perspective, the 
public sphere is “a basic functional principle in democratic society and (…) the ideal of dem-
ocratic communication” (Nieminen 2009, 20). As Dahlberg (2013, 4) summarises it, “the ac-
tual (is) and normative (ought) are two aspects of the same phenomenon”. 
Peters (1994, 45) outlines four normative criteria that according to the deliberative theory of 
public sphere should characterise political communication: (1) It should be relevant and centre 
around a topic of collective interest, (2) should be inclusive and open for every member of the 
political community, (3) should have a discursive structure and (4) should be equal in the sense 
of giving every participant the same chances of contributing to the debate. If these criteria are 
fulfilled, the consensus reached in public deliberation is the decision that can be accepted by 
most members of society and legitimises governmental action (Schulz 1997, 87f.).  
Ever since the pluralist turn in the normative public sphere theory, the notion of one overarch-
ing communicative space is abandoned and the existence of different publics – theme-centred, 
group-bound, local, regional, and so forth – is widely accepted (Karppinen 2009, 59; Pfetsch, 
Löblich & Eilders 2018, 483). However, the Habermasian conception of public sphere builds 
upon the assumption of a common understanding of rationality that allows all participants to 
actually recognise the best argument as such. This requires shared norms and values and a 
certain degree of social cohesion in the political community (Karppinen 2009, 60).  
The deliberative normative public sphere theory has been used as a normative framework to 
assess the political public discourse taking place in the mass media. In the mediated public 
sphere, Neidhardt (2010, 26) defines three groups of actors: First, the speakers, such as politi-
cians, experts, intellectuals or commentators; secondly, the media, who disseminate their in-
terpretations of political issues and events; and thirdly, the passive audience, which consumes 
newspapers, television and radio. If the mediated public sphere fulfils the normative criteria, it 
serves three crucial functions: It (a) makes visible attitudes and values existing in society, (b) 
controls and validates expressed information, and (c) gives orientation for the audiences on the 
one hand and politicians on the other hand about the consensus in society (ibid, 28ff). At the 
same time, the mass media time fulfils an integrative function by producing a shared sense of 




2.1.2. The deliberative network approach 
Traditional mass media once provided the conditions for a contingent mainstream discourse. 
However, today’s hybrid-media system characterised by increasingly intertwined legacy of of-
fline and online media has irrevocably altered the previous paradigm of public discourse. Frag-
mentation and dissonance in the public debate put the deliberative public sphere theory into 
question. Several authors hence call for a re-thinking of traditional public sphere theories 
(Pfetsch, Löblich & Eilders 2018, 479f). 
In recent theoretical debates, poststructuralist discourse theorists have gained increasing atten-
tion (Dahlberg 2013; Pfetsch et al. 2018). Theorists such as Chantal Mouffe (2000) dismiss the 
deliberative model for its presumptions of societal cohesion and consonance in the public de-
bate. The poststructuralist notion of public sphere is based on a pluralist society, in which dif-
ferent societal groups with irreconcilable differences in beliefs, norms and values struggle for 
power. Public communication is therefore characterised by the contestation of hegemonic 
power narratives. The contestation is fuelled by egoism, passions and emotions rather than by 
a common understanding of rationality and consensus (Karppinen 2009, 54). 
Even though the poststructuralist understanding of political communication is better suited to 
capture the increasingly segmented public sphere, it does not offer an analytical framework for 
empirical communication research (Pfetsch et al. 2018, 484). Conversely, the deliberative ap-
proach is broadly recognised as serving an important heuristic function in evaluating the quality 
of public communication (Neidhardt 1994, 38). As such, the deliberative approach is often 
used to uncover tension between the deliberative normative ideal and the descriptive reality 
and serves as a basis for critique with which public speakers, such as journalists and politicians, 
can improve their communicative actions (Dahlberg 2013, 8; Trenz 2009, 42). Trenz (2009, 
42) thus argues for the re-introduction of the deliberative public sphere model as evaluative 
framework. Because of the fundamentally ontological differences between the deliberative and 
antagonistic theoretical approaches, the synthesis of the two approaches is often considered as 
impossible (Dahlberg 2013, 17). 
A solution can be found in deliberative network theories developed by theorists such as Castells 
(1996) or Benkler (2006). Instead of perceiving the society as culturally coherent communities 
with shared values and understanding of rationality, it grasps society as a social network in 
which norms are produced through interaction (Rasmussen 2013, 100). According to this 




sub- or theme-centred publics (Castells 2000, 501). The publics consist of different networks 
of experts, interest-bound, social or cultural groups (Nieminen 2006, 109). A theme-centred 
public can be based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliations, professions or other uniting 
characteristics (Nieminen 2008, 19). As the intensity of interaction within the public is higher 
than the interaction with publics outside of it, each networked public is to a certain degree 
exclusive based on the characteristics that connects it. Depending on the resources available, it 
can be more or less institutionalised, exclusive and powerful (ibid, 24). 
The network approach to deliberation is able to conceptualise today’s hybrid communication 
environment by differentiating between two analytical dimensions. The representational di-
mension captures all the different topics and groups that are discussed in sub-publics in the 
networked public sphere. The presentational dimension then grasps the public deliberation by 
central public speakers in the traditional media. There, the public speakers represent the opin-
ions that were previously debated in the sub-publics, set the public agenda and influence the 
political decision-making process (Rasmussen 2013, 100). The network approach hence em-
phasises the intensity of communicative relations or “ties” (ibid) between deliberative ex-
changes: How successful a claim is in the public sphere depends on its access to power and 
social capital (Knops 2016, 8). 
Through their two-layered approach to the public sphere, the deliberative network theory is 
able to capture the reality of an increasingly fragmented hybrid communication environment. 
At the same time, it pays attention to the communicative infrastructure, making it a suitable 
framework for “a normatively weakened form of deliberative public research” (Pfetsch et al. 
2018, 484, own translation). As such, it is able to “encompass real-world complexity without 
sacrificing deliberation’s normative bite” (Knops 2016, 1).  
 
2.2. Theories of the European public sphere 
As the EU affects existing democracies, there is a consensus that it requires a European public 
sphere, or a “communicative infrastructure used for debating the legitimacy of the project of 
European integration” (Trenz 2009, 35). While authors such as McLuhan (“global village”, 
1962, 1964) or Ulrich Beck (“cosmopolitanism”, 2002) have theorised transnational publics in 
the global context, the EU is the first supranational democratic polity worldwide to provide a 




It is against the backdrop of the deliberative public sphere theory presented above that the 
European public sphere is often theorised (Karppinen 2009, 57). Although the theory is not 
limited to national settings (Trenz 2009, 36f), it was originally designed with a view to cohesive 
political communities that share an understanding of rationality and a commitment to the com-
mon good. In academic discussions, there is thus a consensus that the national conception of 
democratic public sphere cannot simply be transferred to the European level without making 
theoretical adjustments. Even though most authors agree that that “public-ness” is not neces-
sarily bound to “nation-ness” (Trenz 2009, 37), the question of what a transnationalised EU 
public should look like has sparked robust discussion. Academic literature today posit three 
models of European public sphere: The pan-European public sphere model, the Europeanisa-
tion model and the network model. In the following, I will present and discuss these models. 
 
2.2.1. Model 1: The pan-European public sphere  
Literature has almost uniformly rejected the possibility of a pan-European public sphere com-
ing into being. Linguistic diversity in Europe, with its 24 official languages, makes political 
communication targeted at the whole community practically impossible (Eder & Kanter 2000, 
312; Rhomberg 2013, 23f.). Attempts to establish transnational media in Europe’s unofficial 
lingua franca, English, have not succeeded in establishing a pan-European mainstream dis-
course (Koopsmans 2007, 185). Rather, they have created pan-European elite publics (Brügge-
mann, Hepp, Kleinen-von-Königslöw & Wessler 2009, 396f). Examples are the Brussels-based 
“Politico” or media which publish in several languages such as the British “Financial Times”, 
the French “Le Monde Diplomatique”, the German “Deutsche Welle” or the French-German 
television network “ARTE” (Hennen 2016, 35). Also, national governments, who draw their 
power from national elections, adapt their communication strategy to national audiences (Ger-
hards 2000, 288-292). While the democratic reality hence has extended beyond the national 
realm, the dominant popular conception of democracy has stayed in the national context 
(Salovaara-Moring 2009, 10).  
 
2.2.2. Model 2: The Europeanisation model 
The Europeanisation public sphere model is based on the argument that a transnational public 




EU constitutes a unique political project, and second, it is not comparable with the institutions 
of a nation state (e.g. Eder & Kantner 2000, 306f.; Gerhards 2000, 300; Hepp et al. 2012, 21f.). 
What is important, however, is that is fulfils the function of democratic control.   
The advocates of the Europeanisation model suggest that a transnational discussion of topics 
of common concern can be achieved through the Europeanisation of national public spheres. 
In a broader sense, the term Europeanisation can be described as “the process by which regions, 
cultures, public(s), and ways of communicating mesh” (Salovaara-Moring 2009, 9). The model 
assumes that parallel to the Europeanisation of the political and economic sphere, national me-
dia open their agendas for the transnational relevant topics and perspectives (Gerhards 2000, 
277). According to this model, a nationally anchored mediatised public discourse thus develops 
into a European one when it sufficiently discusses the European integration and at the same 
time observes and takes into account the respective debates in the other member states.  
In empirical studies, the Europeanisation of media coverage is often conceptualised with two 
dimensions: First, vertical Europeanisation describes the increase of reporting about the EU 
institutions or politicians, EU policies or European integration. Second, horizontal European-
isation describes the increase coverage of political and economic developments in other mem-
ber states (Koopmans 2007, 186). Both dimensions fulfil different roles in the Europeanised 
public sphere’s function of democratic control. While vertical Europeanisation controls the EU 
institutions and exerts pressure to prove their legitimacy (Hepp et al. 2012, 65), horizontal 
Europeanisation provides an understanding of the intergovernmental cooperation and mutual 
interdependence between the member states. In the best case, creates a sense of community 
and identity amongst the nations (Koopmans & Erbe 2004, 10). Because the joint control of 
the European institutions by the member states and the reciprocal observance of each other can 
be visualised as a transnational patchwork, this European public sphere model is also referred 
to as the “patchwork model” (Eilders & Voltmer 2003, 253).  
 
Empirical findings 
A vast amount of empirical content analyses of news media content has been conducted based 
on the Europeanisation of national public spheres. Due to their focus on different countries and 




somewhat of a patchwork themselves. However, when viewed together, they provide a good 
understanding of the Europeanised public sphere. 
In the beginning of the century, German research still found a considerable discrepancy be-
tween the European integration and the vertical Europeanisation of the German newspaper 
agenda (Gerhards 2000; Eilders & Voltmer 2003). A content analysis of newspapers from all 
over the EU conducted a decade later, however, revealed a considerably higher degree of ver-
tical Europeanisation (Hepp et al. 2012). The latter study demonstrates that the degree of ver-
tical Europeanisation is higher in news coverage about European integration in general and 
policy areas in which the EU has excessive or exclusive competences. These include economy, 
common currency and agriculture. At the same time, there is a lower degree of vertical Euro-
peanisation seen in coverage on social or cultural issues. Hepp et al.’s findings have been rep-
licated by several cross-national and national studies (Koopmans & Erbe 2004; Scherer & Ves-
per 2004; Saurwein 2006; Grill & Boomgaarden 2017).  
Walter (2017, 765) reported that the vertical actor dimension is exclusive and elitist as the EU 
coverage concentrates on central EU governmental actors. As to the EP, Gattermann (2013, 
447) found that the amount of national coverage about the legislative actor depends on the 
public support for the EU, resulting for example in a broader EP coverage in Germany than in 
the United Kingdom. Overall, Gattermann reported that the EP receives rather regular news 
coverage within the EU, oriented on the parliamentary agenda (ibid).  
While the vertical dimension of the media discourse approximately reflects the European inte-
gration process, research indicates an insufficient degree of Europeanisation on the horizontal 
dimension. Several studies identified that size, geographical closeness, economic power and 
the historical importance of a country are structural factors that determine the amount of the 
coverage, which leads to a disregard for a majority of member states (Brüggemann & Königlöw 
2009; Wessler 2007, Saurwein 2006; Grill & Boomgaarden 2017). Moreover, governments are 
systematically overrepresented while actors from the civil society are underrepresented when 
compared with national discourses in several member states (Koopmans 2007). Findings show-
ing a horizontal elite focus have been replicated a decade later (Grill & Boomgaarden 2017; 
Walter 2017). This leads to the conclusion that the European public sphere is even less inclu-
sive than national ones (Koopmans 2007, 199).  
Scholarship on the Europeanisation model also argues that, for a real Europeanisation of the 




Different studies however confirmed that in EU news coverage the national perspective pre-
vails (for example, Lichtenstein & Eilders 2018). Grill and Boomgaarden (2017, 579) found 
that a European perspective is almost only taken if the coverage deals with EU exclusive com-
petences. Another criterion is that the news coverage should deal with the same topics and the 
same time. Moreover, public speakers from different EU member states should reciprocally 
reply to each other. Brüggemann and Königlöw’s (2009) cross-national content analysis found 
neither convergence nor reflexivity. Convergence is however reported to increase during crisis 
events (Berkel 2006). 
In general, findings on the Europeanisation model discourse showed that vertical and horizon-
tal Europeanisation is higher in quality newspapers (Trenz 2004; Hepp et al. 2012). This im-
plies that only socio-economic elites take part in the European public discourse. The European 
media discourse is hence characterised by “multiple segmentations” (Hepp et al. 2012, 81), 
including a geographic and a socio-economic segmentation.  
Several studies indicated that the reasons for the weak editorial news coverage are structural. 
According to this research, relatively few resources are invested in Brussels-based journalism 
(Meyer 2009, 1053). This is because the EU coverage lacks news value: The EU’s headquarters 
are too far away from the national capitals, the decision-making processes are lengthy and 
complex and the EU institutional terminology is bureaucratic (de Vreese 2003, 162ff). More-
over, the national audiences are disinterested and lack the necessary background knowledge 
that they would need to understand in-depth coverage about the EU (ibid). At the same time, 
national politicians with positions on the European level, who could direct the public attention 
to EU affairs, often do not do so: MEPs do not profit from publicity in their role as EU citizen 
representatives (Meyer 2009, 1053). On the contrary, because European elections are perceived 
as second-order elections, voting decisions are mostly oriented on national politics (ibid). For 
that reason, the national parties who are organised in European party groups in the EP invest 
fewer resources in their campaigning in European than in national elections (de Vreese 2009, 
10, 15; Schuck, Xezonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci & de Vreese 2010, 41f). The campaigns are 
moreover nationally anchored, with European issues constitute “at best a minor element” (Hix 
& Marsh 2007, 506). The national ministers and heads of state direct the attention to the EU 
mostly when a policy outcome stands in contrast to the national interest. In that case, they 
blame the EU institutions for it. When a policy matter is however beneficial for their member 




Taken together, the empirical findings on the Europeanisation model show that through the 
mass media, “[a] ‘public sphere’ related to policy-making on the European level only 
emerges—if at all—on an ‘issue by issue’ basis and is usually restricted to small ‘expert-com-
munities’” (Hennen 2016, 21). This challenges the notion that the communication infrastruc-
ture to discuss European policies in the mass media is able to fulfil its democratic function and 
nurture the EU’s legitimacy. According to Hennen (2016, 39), it is therefore important to con-
sider also internet communication in the European public sphere research, as “the Internet will 
not be a substitute for the public sphere made up by mass media, but is now and will in the 
future increasingly be used as a means of political information and communication”. The third 
model of the European public sphere therefore takes into account publics that are constituted 
apart from the mass media. It is suitable to conceptualise communication about the EU taking 
place on political social media pages. 
 
2.2.3. Model 3: The network model of the European public sphere 
In academic discussions the growing popularity of political online communication has been 
linked to a possible emergence of a more lively and less elitist European public sphere (Vesnic-
Alujevic 2012a, 2012b; Hennen 2016; Valentini 2006). The third model of European public 
sphere hence does not only focus on mass media, but takes into account online as well as niche 
media. Then, the European public communication is not only characterised by an abundance 
of political issues, cultural interpretations and languages, but also by an ever increasing prolif-
eration of media and communication channels (Rasmussen 2013, 102). Because of the complex 
nature of the European public communication, it seems apparent to conceptualise the European 
public sphere as “a complex network of topics and viewpoints circulating as multiple voices 
on local, national and international scales” (ibid). 
A popular network model for the European context was developed by Nieminen (2006, 2008, 
2009). As described in Chapter 2.1.2., the European public sphere is theorised as a network of 
thematically concentrated and separable publics based on certain uniting characteristics. In or-
der to be relevant for the European public sphere, they do not need to be pan-European or 
transnational. The important characteristic is that their topics of discussion are relevant for all 
EU citizens (Nieminen 2008, 24). The European public sphere is then constituted through a 
public deliberation of pre-debated claims (ibid). As a network, it is characterised through 




and public actors interact because European issues unite them. In relation to national public 
sphere, however, the European public sphere is characterised by weak ties because the overall 
intensity of the interaction is not as high as in a national context (Rasmussen 2013, 102f). 
Given the fact that the network approach to the European public sphere captures publics that 
form around individual policy issues and problems, the publics in the model are often under-
stood to be expert publics (Hennen 2016, 36). The network model is hence often propagated 
by critics of the deliberative public sphere theory, who reject the idea of a rational consensus 
– especially in a multicultural and diverse Europe (Karppinen 2009, 58). Several scholars point 
out that a poststructuralist notion of the European public sphere can explain new democratic 
practices, for example why organised interest groups and lobbies have more influence in the 
EU than voters and protesters on the streets (Salovaara-Moring 2009, 10). Critics of the antag-
onistic network model, however, accuse it of being too exclusive since it only takes into con-
sideration only elitist sub-publics (Eilders & Voltmer 2003, 253). It leaves open the question 
of how these organised interest groups generate legitimacy for their claims in the wider Euro-
pean public as well as how the EU’s governance can be legitimised by its citizens who are left 
out of this system of “privileged pluralism” (Binderkrantz, Christiansen & Pedersen 2015, 95) 
among organised interests (Eilders & Voltmer 2003, 253; Hennen 2016, 36).  
In order to conduct research into the online communication about European issues involving 
ordinary European citizens in the internet, so into the “electronic European public sphere” 
(Michailidou 2010, 66), a deliberative network model is needed. The deliberative approach has 
the advantage of providing an evaluation benchmark for the assessment of the quality of polit-
ical online communication (Trenz 2009). Different authors have used this to perceive social 
media as a public sphere which creates a networked public (Vatnøy 2016, 123). Each page 
offering a space for a political discussion constitutes a "deliberative forum" (Vesnic-Alujevic 
& Nacarino 2012, 68) and can be conceptualised as an online public space creating a public. 
The deliberative network normative criteria model can then be applied on each public as an 
evaluative benchmark to assess the quality of the political communication about the EU. 
In the following chapter, I will present how social media has changed the public discourse and 
which opportunities and risks they have opened up. Consecutively, I will explore how public 
institutions such as the EP use public media for direct communication with citizens to increase 
their legitimacy and discuss the question of whether institutional social media communication 




3.  Social media and European democracy 
Historically, “new practices of democracy” (Salovaara-Moring 2009, 10) have been associated 
with social and technological transformations. Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) identify three 
main stages in the evolution of political communication in Western democracies. Each trans-
formation from one stage to another has brought changes to the news coverage, political cam-
paigning, the relationship between power and society and hence to theoretic concepts capturing 
the effects of political communication (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018, 244). According to Blumler 
and Kavanagh (1999), political communication in the premodern stage took place in newspa-
pers. In the modern stage, TV became the dominant medium. Finally, the advent of the internet 
in the early 90s created the postmodern age. It was characterised by an unprecedented prolif-
eration of media channels and professionalised political communication due to an increasing 
competition for attention (ibid). Recently, Blumler (2013, September 17) argued that after so-
cial media has become an integral part of the organisation of societies a fourth stage of political 
communication has begun (ibid; Van Dijck 2013, 4). For the first time symmetrical communi-
cation between politicians and citizens has become possible (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018, 244). 
In the following section, I will discuss some of the changes social media has introduced to the 
public discourse. Here, I will present the academic debate between optimists and sceptics. Op-
timists advocate that the online public sphere offers a better setting to meet the normative cri-
teria of deliberative democratic theory than the traditional media. Sceptics on the other hand 
argue that social media enforces existing power relations and that its technological architecture 
is not suited to offer a space for deliberation. Consecutively, I will look at how political insti-
tutions use social media to connect with citizens. Here I will pay a special focus on institutional 
campaigning. Finally, I will discuss how the European Parliament uses social media and ex-
plore the question if it can support the development of the European public sphere. 
Because this study deals with the EP’s communication on Facebook, I will use the social net-
working site as an example to illustrate the functioning of social media in general. Facebook is 
an Internet-based application that facilitate communal activities and the exchange of user gen-
erated content (Van Dijck 2013, 4; Villi & Matikainen 2016, 109). The general-purpose com-
munication platform was launched in 2004 by Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg. 
Today, it is the largest social networking site today and one of the most frequently visited 
webpages (Allmer 2015, iii; Hoffmann, Proferes & Zimmer 2018, 200, 213; Rieder Abdulla, 




3.1. The democratic potential of social media 
Shortly after the launch of the commercial internet in in the beginning of the 1990s, much hope 
was placed in its capability to create a more equal, democratic world. Traditional media was 
seen as undemocratic. Its economisation gave importance to news values favouring power, 
disputes, mistakes and scandals (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, 215ff). As a consequence, news 
coverage increasingly simplified and personalized content while avoiding substantial and com-
plex policy issues (ibid). It was also considered elitist and exclusive, banning actors from the 
political landscape’s periphery such as small parties, NGOs or the civil society from the public 
discourse (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, 209). With vast parts of society’s voices excluded from 
the political debate, public opinion was not reflecting the majority opinion (Gerhards 1998, 
694). As a result, elections or referenda were the only vehicle to reflect majority opinion (Nei-
dhardt 2010, 32f.). The free and open internet, on the other hand, inspired political activists 
and tech pioneers such as Barlow (1996, February 8) to dream about a “world where anyone, 
anywhere may express his or her beliefs” and “that all may enter without privilege or prejudice 
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth”.  
The early techno-optimism resonated in the academic sphere, where several authors argued 
that through the participatory new media, civic cynicism, the low trust and the lack of demo-
cratic participation characterising the modern TV-dominated stage of political communication 
(Dahlgren 2018, 24) could be cured. Already in 1994, Rheingold projected the emergence of a 
virtual community, in which everyone’s voice can be relevant. The optimistic voices became 
louder with the emergence of interactive social media platforms. In his popular work “Theory 
of the network society”, theorist Castells (2010, 507) suggests that many-to-many grassroots 
communication through social media gives the power over the public discourse back to the 
people and weakens the elitist mainstream media. As such, new media were able to give power 
back to the people and political movements worldwide (ibid; Castells 2007, 254). Other theo-
ries were issued by Tapscott and William’s “Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes 
Everything” (2006) and Benkler’s “Wealth of Networks” (2006), both of which predict that 
social media will create a new participatory democracy, or Shirky’s “Here comes Everybody” 
(2008) in which social media enhances the freedom of speech. In sum, the techno-optimistic 
accounts hence argue that new media enhances the participatory and deliberative democracy 
which results in the emancipation of the people from the established elitist power structures 




In recent years, the early optimism for the democratic potential of social media in general and 
the technological utopian voices in particular began to decline. Especially the “populist revolt” 
(Dahlgren 2018, 24), referring to popular votes in favour for nationalistic actors such as US 
President Trump, the Hungarian prime minister Orban or the exit of the UK from the European 
Union (‘Brexit’), has often been connected to the use of new media (ibid). Contemporary the-
orists such as Allmer (2015) therefore argue for a dialectical view of technology and social 
media, taking into account its opportunities and risks and giving special attention to its design 
and “technological structure enables and constrains human activity and thinking” (ibid, 21). 
Thus, in the following section five techno-optimistic notions will be critically discussed from 
the perspective of social media’s algorithmic architecture. These notions touch upon power, 
equality, deliberation, participation and information in social media.  
 
3.1.1. Power in social media 
Techno-optimistic view is largely based on the technological deterministic notion that technol-
ogy is ideologically neutral and its effect on society are determined by how it is used (Hess 
2015, 121). In the recent years, this presumption has been under widespread critique. Critical 
theorists argue that inequality is a central characteristic of the Web 2.0’s capitalistic network 
architecture where power relations are structurally solidified in the mode of production (Van 
Dijck 2013, 4; Ampuja 2012, 290; Apprich 2015, 123). As the network of URLs was largely 
woven by corporate actors for corporate interests, its goal is to concentrate the highest internet 
traffic on their pages (Dahlgren 2018, 21; Allmer 2015, 22). The Web 2.0’s organisational 
principle is the power law, also known as the “the rich get richer”-effect (Apprich 2015, 133): 
Simplified this means that if the number of clicks or visitors on a page is high, the algorithms 
will regard it as popular and position it higher, which attracts even more attention to the page 
(Bucher 2012, 1667f). Conversely, the fewer people who iteract with a pages, the more likely 
it faces the threat of invisibility” (Bucher 2012, 1175). The “winner-takes-all economy” (Taplin 
2017, 21) of the internet hence allows knots with a dominant position to become even more 
central as the network grows (Apprich 2015, 133). Scale-free networks such as the Web 2.0 
are therefore characterised by a few very powerful hubs – other than random networks, in 
which all knots are equally disseminated (ibid, 132f).  
Today, the dominant platforms which claim the most internet traffic are the search engine 




Facebook4. Accordingly, Facebook and Alphabet have become two of the most profitable com-
panies worldwide – without creating its own content or products (Taplin 2017, 8). Instead, the 
business models of social media companies are based on the collection of personal data, which 
platform providers turn into advertisement revenues (Allmer 2015, 3). In fact, the largest part 
of Facebook’s annual revenue comes from advertisement (ibid). Facebook collects data by en-
couraging user participation. To do so, it gives users the complete control over the “profile 
entities” (Rieder et al. 2015, 4), thus personal profiles or public pages, they want to subscribe 
in their personal news feeds (ibid). Facebook’s news feed is “a list of status updates of the 
contacts in a user’s network ... in the interest of showing viewers the content they will find 
most relevant and engaging” (Jouhki, Lauk, Penttinen, Sormanen & Uskali 2016, 78). Face-
book’s aim of showing the users the most interesting posts or “content items” (Rieder et al. 
2015, 4) is to maximise the users’ attention to the platform and encourage user participation 
(Davies 2018, 637). Villi and Matikainen (2016, 109f) distinguish between “implicit participa-
tion”, such as “sharing” or “liking”, and “explicit participation”, which involves the production 
of content, such as writing posts or commenting. For Facebook, implicit participation is more 
important than explicit content creation as it provides the company with data to extract personal 
profiles, which are sold to advertisers. For that reason, implicit participation facilitated through 
an easy-to-use user interface where one click suffices to like a post (ibid, 111). Moreover, each 
act of Facebook participation generates more the attention to the platform because through the 
network effect each post that was interacted with will appear in the news feeds of the user’s 
contact. Thus, Facebook is “designed to enhance human connections and constant connectivity 
because smaller friendship networks and less communication would lead to less user data to 
market” (ibid). In Facebook’s “like economy” (ibid, 111), the users’ urge to connect is thus 
employed to implement neoliberal principles (Van Dijck 2013, 17). 
Critics condemn the user commodification of social media companies in today’s “information 
capitalism” (Apprich 2015, 139). While users are employed as data providers, they have no 
control over ownership rights nor do they profit from the incomes generated through their free 
labour (Fisher 2012, 179). Social networking sites such as Facebook are hence characterised 
by asymmetrical economic power relations between the platform providers and users (Allmer 
2015, 5). According to Taplin (2017, 4), these are manifested through the internet’s capitalist 
architecture and its cyber-libertarian ideology refusing regulations or user protection rights. 
                                               




3.1.2. Equality in social media  
Techno-optimists argue that social media’s low entrance barriers for public discourse allow for 
a “deliberation with popular inclusion” (Ferree et al. 2002, 300). Including in that list are citi-
zens as well as small, new and less resourceful political actors from the periphery, a central 
characteristic of the deliberative public sphere theory (ibid). The equalisation hypothesis 
emerged from the assumption that the Web 2.0 is an open space where everybody’s say is 
equal. It argues that in the internet, the power relations between powerful and less powerful 
actors in the political arena will diminish as the latter one could access the public sphere inde-
pendently from the exclusive traditional media and instead communicate directly with citizens 
(Lilleker, Koc-Michalska, Schweitzer, Jacunski, Marwick, Boyd 2011, 196f). 
Critics on the equalisation theory, however, argue that offline hierarchies are merely transferred 
into the online sphere: The relational normalisation theory argues that the relations between 
powerful and less powerful political actors will not substantially change through social media 
(Schweitzer 2011, 312). This is because in the public sphere, the visibility of an actor or a 
message is a central parameter for power (Bucher 2012, 1166). In the internet, power hierar-
chies come into being through the numbers of subscribers, readers or viewers (Aday, Farrell, 
Freelon, Lynch, Sides & Dewar 2013, 3f). Powerful actors’ social media initially attract more 
attention than less powerful actors. Because of Facebook’s network structure, powerful actors 
can even expand their visibility disproportionately and accumulate their already high social 
capital (Ampuja 2012, 290): If, for example, an average Facebook user has 100, with each 
liking of a post of a public page on Facebook, 100 more people will potentially see it. Secondly, 
they have more financial ressources to manage their online profiles, pay targeted advertisement 
and engage in data-driven political communication (Aagaard 2016, 1). Thus, several theorists 
think that the “richer get richer”-effect will rather enforce hierarchies, the centralisation of 
power and existing electoral inequalities (Apprich 2015, 131; McNair 2011, 5). Indeed, empir-
ical research suggests that through the power law distribution only a few political candidates 
on Facebook attract a large number of followers while the majority of candidates remains al-





3.1.3. Information in social media 
Techno-optimists argue that the internet provides access to new ideas through unfiltered infor-
mation, also referred to as “gatewatching” (Aday et al. 2013, 3). This replaces traditional media 
gatekeeping where news coverage is exclusive, driven by news value driven and favouring 
prominence, power and scandals. Free information also provides for a new democratic scrutiny 
of the political leaders. According to Castells (2007, 243f), their mediatised politics were 
marked by personalisation and scandalisation and have produced a political apathy and the 
erosion of the political elites’ legitimacy. 
Critics however assume that the web is not the open market place for information as it is 
assumed by techno optimists (Aday et al. 2013, 4). The power law does not only organise the 
visibility of web pages but also individual pieces of content and hence the information that is 
consumed in the Web 2.0. Hence, social media posts that generate interaction are simply 
promoted by Facebook’s algorithms, nonwithstanding the content.  
Topics that create reactions in social media are seldomly moderate. Larsson (2016, 286) for 
example has shown that in the Nordic countries political Facebook posts with controversial 
stances towards immigration are the most successful ones in terms of likes and shares. Social 
media is said to make controversial attitudes more acceptable: Different studies have shown an 
increased visibility of racism (Jabubowicz 2018, 69f; Silva, Mondal, Correa, Benevenuto & 
Weber 2016, 690) and Islamophobia (Awan 2016, 17f) in both Twitter and Facebook. In the 
Brexit referendum, “supporters were seven times more numerous than opponents on Twitter 
and five times more active on Instagram” (Persily 2017, 64). Moreover, social media have been 
connected to a rapid growth of populism (Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel 2017, 1111ff). A 
study in four EU member states has shown that populist actors make use of their direct con-
nection with citizens to voice false claims and avoid their scrutiny through the media. To con-
tinuously benefit from this system, it is hence an essential part of populistic campaigns to create 
distrust in the media (ibid, 1119).  
Due to the lack of scrutiny, this new communication environment makes room for rumours, 
conspiracies and fake news (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018, 244; Engesser et al. 2017, 1110), so 
“news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers” (Allcott & 
Gentzkow 2017, 213). Studies have shown that in the U.S. Presidential election 2016, fake 
news shared on social media played a crucial role in the public debate. A BuzzFeed analysis 




top election stories from 19 major news outlets combined” (Silverman, 2016 November 16). 
Moreover, almost three times as many fake news articles were in support of the right-wing 
populist candidate Trump than for his liberal opponent Clinton (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, 
212). Moreover, research has shown that during the US Presidential election debate, bots pro-
duced 20% of all tweets (Persily 2017, 70) and in the Brexit debate, one percent of automated 
Twitter accounts were responsible for one third of all messages (Narayanan, Howard, Kollanyi, 
Elswah 2017, 1). The new technologies hence enable misinformation campaigns on an 
unprecedented scale.  
 
3.1.4. Political participation in social media 
The technological deterministic notion assumes that technology is the number one driver of 
social change (Hess 2015, 121). Techno-optimists hence argue that the social media can foster 
a new participatory culture and facilitate political movements across national borders. Bennett 
and Segerberg (2012, 743) have coined the term “connective action” for the mobilisation of 
grass-root movements whose organisation mainly relies on online technologies. Prominent ex-
amples of collective action initiated or organised through social media are the global anti-cap-
italist protest movement Occupy Wall Street in 2011 (Croeser 2014, 1) or several democratic 
revolutions in illiberal regimes including Arab Spring in North-Africa in 2011 (Bennett & 
Segerberg 2012, 742) as well as the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 (Lysenco & Desouza 
2010, September 6) and Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 (Bohdanova 2014, 133f). Diamond 
(2010, 70) therefore has called social media “liberation technology”. 
Also, Facebook CEO Zuckerberg argues that the mission of his company is “to give people the 
power to share and to make the world more open and connected” (Zuckerberg 2009 as cited in 
Hoffmann et al. 2018, 214). Many scholars however point out that the narrative of empower-
ment and connectivity is enforced by tech companies mainly to disguise the free digital labour 
and user surveillance taking place on social media platforms (Bucher 2012, 1175; Vesnic-Alu-
jevic 2016, 423). According to this view, Zuckerberg’s rhetoric gives users the impression that 
their voice counts while in reality the platform’s user interface is designed to enable easy and 
fast user interaction only to collect user data (Hoffmann et al. 2018, 201f; Villi & Matikainen 
2016, 110). Thus “a post’s like count can be interpreted as a measure of attention, engagement, 
or resonance (…) but, at the same time, it functions as a means for the system to decide whether 




Due to social media participation’s facileness, it has become more numerous but at the same 
time less meaningful. Research highlighted major differences between the motivations for con-
ventional forms of offline participation and new forms of online participation, which exceed 
the mere sphere of action. Gibson and Cantijoch (2013, 713f) point out that online participation 
is used to express personal views rather than to influence political actions. Also, Lilleker and 
Koc-Michalska (2017, 34f) find that the motivation for while offline participation is largely 
intrinsic, online participation is extrinsically motivated by wishing to be accepted within the 
personal network. The result is a large share of implicit participation without personal meaning, 
also referred to as “clicktivism” (ibid). Jenkins and Carpentier (2013, 271) hence argue for a 
normatively strict view on online participation, which differentiates between a political and 
less political approach to participation: Only if it has a policy impact, online “participation” 
can be called as such; otherwise, it is merely “interaction”. 
As to the role of social media in political protests, different scholars also point out that the role 
of social media in these events is overrated. While they can give visibility to democratic coun-
ter publics (Bucher 2012, 1166), the so-called social media revolutions and protests were car-
ried out through the combination of online technologies, physical protests and broadcasting 
media (for example, for the role of broadcasting media in the Arab Spring: Ahy 2016; Rane & 
Salem 2012). Furthermore, the continuously illiberal or corrupt regimes in North Africa and 
Ukraine show that social media cannot equalise power relations in the long-run.  
In addition, many authors point out that online technologies pose a risk to dissidents in illiberal 
regimes, because they enable not only surveillance for economic profit, but also state surveil-
lance (Apprich 2015, 135f). While early techno-optimists such as Schultz and Lovink (1996, 
2) still suspected that the internet is too big for state surveillance, it is commonly accepted to-
day that the internet is used to monitor citizens by illiberal regimes. In a NewScientist com-
mentary, Morozov (2011, March 2) points out that in the Arab Spring, Facebook was not only 
used by anti-regime protesters but also to monitor and manipulate the dissidents. In this context, 
the author describes new technologies that facilitate social media as a “double-edged 
sword”. In the US, moreover, all the big platform providers, including Facebook, have given 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) access to their data for the spying programme PRISM 
(Taplin 2017, 157f). According to participants of Occupy Oakland, Facebook was also censor-




3.1.5. Deliberation in social media 
Techno-optimist argue that social media offers discursive spaces where users can enter a re-
flexive and equal discussion. Critics however refute that notion due to the personalised news 
feeds based on the user’s data. According to Ivic (2017, 83) deliberation differs from a dialogue 
or a debate because of its “power to transform preferences that an agent previously held. On 
the other hand, the term ‘debate’ can be applied to an argumentative exchange governed by 
rules”. Humans, however, tend to interact with content or people that support already existing 
views, which is also known as confirmation bias (Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson 2014, 
171f). As a result, Facebook’s personalised news feeds rather confirm the users’ pre-existing 
opinions than challenging them. This phenomenon has been labelled by Pariser (2011) as “filter 
bubble” (Davies 2018, 637). The term is often used as equivalent to an “echo chamber”, which 
is a space “whereby people gather with like-minded and thereby collectively screen out infor-
mation and views that do not sit well with the group consensus” (Dahlgren 2018, 25). While 
the term filter bubble thus stresses the technological power in the personalisation of media 
content, the term echo chamber stresses the users’ agency in the selective exposure.  
While social media’s algorithms create an “interconnected spheres of public awareness” (Aa-
gaard 2016, 1), studies show that the users are often unaware of the echo chambers (Rader & 
Gray 2015, 177f). By decreasing the chances of encountering ideologically diverse news con-
tent, social media consumption surreptitiously changes people’s understanding of the world 
(Sunstein 2017, 2). This results in a fragmentation of the public discourse into homogenous 
sub-publics in which public knowledge is constructed in isolation (Apprich 2015, 137f). At the 
same time, society-overarching gatekeeping, agenda-setting and media effects through the 
mass media become less and less effective (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018, 247ff). The lack of shared 
experiences in society and a positive feedback loop through which existing attitudes and opin-
ions are re-enforced within the segregated political groups lead to an ideological polarisation 
(Spohr 2017, 150f; Sunstein 2017, 9). Because of the fragmentation of society into self-con-
forming political groups, social media is for example often connected to the recent rise of iden-
tity politics, populism and right-wing counter-publics in the Western world (Postill 2018, 755; 
Dahlgren 2018, 24f). In a comprehensive literature review, Spohr (2017, 155ff) concludes that 
echo chambers played a crucial role in the polarisation of the public opinion in both, the US 




From the view point of deliberative democracy, the current differentiation in the public dis-
course makes it difficult for political decision-makers to identify the public opinion that can 
guide their executive actions (Rasmussen 2013, 99). This is why, critics warn that a further 
decline of mainstream journalism leads to a decline of public deliberation and gives way to 
what Dahlgren (2018, 25) describes as “epistemic crisis of democracy” and a development 
towards a stage of “post-truth”, when facts and rationality are becoming increasingly dismissed 
in favour of emotional accounts and subjective beliefs, which will eventually lead to a state at 
which the objective truth is not trusted anymore. Exposure to a variety of topics and attitudes 
divergent from their own are crucial for the social integrity, on which a deliberative democracy 
builds up (Sunstein 2017, 6f; Dahlgren 2018, 25). 
 
3.1.6. Discussion: A differentiated view on social media 
After an initial phase of technological optimism, in the academic discussion about the demo-
cratic potential of social media today a differentiated view prevails. The notion that social me-
dia can enhance democracy by transferring power from the elites to the people has been rela-
tivised by shifting the attention from their potentials to their constraints (Allmer 2015, iii). the 
algorithmic structure with which media companies organise information for to corporate inter-
ests and through which they have power over content and conditions of participation in the 
online discourse (Apprich 2015, 134; Allmer 2015, 16). Despite of their effects on the public 
discourse and democracy, these “decisions were made by engineers and executives at Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon (plus, a few others) and imposed upon the public with no regulatory 
scrutiny” (Taplin 2017, 4). From the viewpoint on deliberative democracy, Rasmussen (2013, 
97f) concludes that the differentiation within the public sphere produced by social media will 
decrease the possibility to find a normative basis for the public legitimisation of political 
actions.  
Authors such as Postill (2018, 761), however, relativise the connection between social media 
and a decline in deliberative democracy. According to him, new media is only “an integral part 
of the total media system“. Today, the communication taking place in them is hence largely 
interwoven with communication in other media (ibid). According to Vatnøy (2016, 122) more-
over, the reductionistic approach of the dualism of equalisation and normalisation in the aca-




argues that more qualitative research about the political deliberation in social media is needed 
to better understand the complexity of its impact on the public discourse.  
While the general effect of social media on the public discourse at large is ambivalent, there 
have been democratic instances through social media, especially when it comes to mobilising 
voters or protest movements. As a positive example of social media communication, especially 
the election campaign of former US President Obama which successfully mobilised moderate 
voters is often mentioned (Postill 2018, 756). Many authors think therefore that the internet 
helps political actors to step into a direct dialogue with citizens and thereby reducing cynicism 
and political disengagement (Lilleker & Malagón 2010, 25). Also, in the European public 
sphere research the view that social media communication can strengthen the relationship be-
tween the EU institutions and citizens has inspired a branch of research (for example, Valentini 
2006; Michailidou 2007; Meriläinen & Vos 2010; Vesnic-Alujevic 2012a; Vesnic-Alujevic & 
Nacarino 2012). The following section will therefore explore the social media use of political 
actors in more detail.  
 
3.2. Political promotion in social media 
According to Blumler (2013, September 17), today’s fourth age of political communication is 
characterised by direct communication between political actors and citizens that bypasses the 
media sphere (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018, 244). In fact, first experiments with online campaigning 
by political parties and candidates were already taking place in the mid 90’s (Blumler & Ka-
vanagh 1999, 224). However, the early Web 1.0 websites were merely used as top-down com-
munication channels to provide information and to influence voting choices (Lilleker et al. 
2011, 198). In contrast, today’s social media enable symmetrical communication between po-
litical decision-makers and their constituencies to a degree as no other medium as they allow 
the voters to become active communicators (Aagaard 2016, 7f; Van Dijck 2013, 5).  
When discussing the social media communication between political actors and citizens as well 
as its impact on the democratic public sphere, the promotional aspect of two-way communica-
tion has to be taken into account. It is broadly recognised that the “promotional culture” (Davis 
2013f) has expanded the corporate sphere and become present in political institutions. In the 
next two sections, the promotional culture in the political sphere as well as the promotional 




3.2.1. Promotional culture in the political sphere 
The paradigm that social media can connect political decision-makers with their constituencies 
has been put forward heavily by social media companies (Nielsen & Vaccari 2013, 2334). This 
narrative, however, leaves out the “promotional intermediaries” (Aroncsky & Powers 2010, 8; 
Davis 2013, 1). Professionals such as social media officers, communication advisors or poll-
sters, however, play a crucial role in mediating the communication between the political actors 
and the citizens (Aagaard 2016, 1). Being trained to sell ideas to the public, they are responsible 
for identifying the saleable product, the potential audience, the medium and the message on 
behalf of the political entity for whom they work (Davis 2013, 2).  
The promotional professionalisation of political communication is part of the expansion of 
capitalism in multiple spheres of life: In the increasingly competitive capitalistic environment, 
in which neo-liberal thinking has become the dominant mindset, drawing attention to one’s 
political products is essential for generating power resources in form of votes and political 
legitimacy (Aroncsyk & Powers 2010, 4; Aagaard 2016, 7). Because promotion has conse-
quently become the main form of communication, critics talk about the “commodification of 
the public discourse” (Aroncsyk & Powers 2010, 7). Today, through the increasing prolifera-
tion of cheap and easily accessible communication channels and the unprecedented competi-
tion in a free market of ideas, the promotional culture has manifested itself in political parties 
and institutions more than ever before (Blumler 2013, September 17; Davis 2013, 1f).  
What signifies the promotional professionalisation of political communication best are the term 
borrowed from the economic sphere: Political PR describes “the management process by 
which an organization ... for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, 
seeks to influence and to establish, build and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations 
with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals.” (Strömbäck & Kiousis 
2011, 8). Promotional campaigns are specific elements of political PR. In relation to the EU 
they can be understood as “activities … which aim at informing and promoting the EU cause 
among citizens and other publics” (Valentini 2006, 80) or in short as “an attempt to commit 
Europeans to EU cause” (ibid, 84). Each campaign is designed to create varying opinions and 
attitudes in each public, depending on whom they are directed to. The core target audiences of 
political institutions usually include politicians, NGO’s, companies, the media and the voters 




history, and they draw on taken-for granted discourses and values circulating in a particular 
culture” (Price 2012, 12).  
Until the early 2000’s the promotional professionalisation of political institutions was reflected 
most of all in the mediatisation of politics: Political institutions adjusted their actions to the 
changing demands of the media to receive an extensive and positive coverage (Meyer 2009, 
1049). Today, public pages on Facebook and other social media platforms are used by political 
entities for self-presentation and marketing (Rieder et al. 2015, 4). Because Facebook offers 
access to large audiences, permanent campaigning on the platform has become a standard for 
political actors today (Larsson 2016, 283; Price 2012, 21; Vesnic-Alujevic 2012a, 36). Through 
the behavioural data produced by its users, social media, however, allows political actors to 
modify their products or images directly to the wishes of different audience. This is done 
through political marketing strategies that use behavioural data to track the success of cam-
paigns and manage the public opinion by ascertaining which issues are important amongst the 
voters at large or selected sub-publics (Williams & Newman 2013, 1f; Van Dijck 2013, 16; 
Jeffares 2014, 86).  
 
3.2.2. Institutional promotion in social media  
Due to political parties and candidates’ possibility to modify their political agendas and the 
competition for votes, the marketisation of politics is most prevalent in the free electoral market 
(Aroncsyk & Powers 2010, 4). The majority of studies exploring political actors’ use of social 
media have therefore been conducted on political parties and candidates (ibid). However, also 
public institutions have adopted a market-minded mindset (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness & 
Røvik 2007, 8). In contrast to electoral candidates, their communication underlies normative 
restrictions because the heads of public institutions have been democratically elected and civil 
servants have been appointed to serve the people (ibid, 6f; Valentini, Laursen 2014, 5). As a 
result, institutional social media communication needs to be characterised by transparency, 
neutrality, objectivity, factuality (Valentini, Laursen 2014, 5). Political institutions use of so-
cial media for different purposes, for example to quickly spread information in case of emer-
gencies or to draw attention to offline events (Jeffares 2014, 86). Social media is however used 




Executive opportunities of political actors are determined by the support of their basis (Valen-
tini 2006, 81). For the EU, it was reflected by the rejection of a common European constitution 
in referenda in two member states in 2005. Citizens’ support and the stability of a regime is 
hence dependent on the success of what Price (2012, 11) calls a “narrative of legitimacy”, 
which is the “highest level justification for states and regimes”. Next to a strategic narrative, 
the institutional image as it is a key factor in determining the public support (Valentini 2006, 
83, 88). Similar to the corporate sphere, a stable brand identity serves as a rhetorical device 
which can cover up ideological changes in the political agenda and disguise unpopular govern-
ment strategies (Aronczyk & Powers 2010, 5f). Both, narratives and images, are however prod-
ucts of discursive exchange and are deliberated and contested by public speakers from media, 
society and other powerful groups (Price 2012, 11). Ever since online publics have gained 
saliency in the public discourse, institutions have aimed to enter into direct communication 
with their stakeholders to implement strategic narratives and produce legitimacy (ibid, 12; Val-
entini 2006, 88).  
Symmetric online communication between the institution and the citizens means a transfer of 
power from political actors to a broad and unstructured online public and thereby a loss of 
control for the institutional actor (Price 2012, 21). Institutions hence tend to manage the public 
opinion by creating strategic narratives that are congruent with the temporal narrative of power 
that circulates in the targeted public (ibid, 16). However, in a highly competitive social media 
environment where the composition of the audience is large and unstable, the sender is depend-
ent on constant cues to construct an “imagined audience”, which it can address in terms of 
culture, language and style and adapt its brand to (Marwick & boyd 2010, 2). An important by-
product of social media communication is the production of behavioural data (Van Dijck 2013, 
16). Not surprisingly, local and national governments therefore belong to one of the main mar-
kets for social media monitoring software (Jeffares 2014, 86). Due to their implicit nature, the 
quantitative data about Facebook likes and shares alone are no good indicators to obtain infor-
mation about the audience (Rieder et al. 2015, 5). Institutions therefore use feedback-based 
marketing strategies, which have their origin in the corporate sphere.  
Grassroots marketing builds on the assumption that by empowering the costumers to contribute 
to the brand image, the audience identifies with the brand. Moreover, the “democratisation of 
marketing” allows the corporations to represent themselves as responsive entities (Serazio 




actions can be negotiated (Valentini 2006, 83, 88). The generated audience data, including 
preferences, values and concerns, is constantly implemented in institutional image manage-
ment. It also influences the style of the communication and the information that is released. 
Like this, the institutional actors can comply with the norms of objectivity, factuality but avoid 
tensions between the institution and the audience and generate legitimacy in through tailored 
communication with selected audiences (ibid). Institutional social media pages can be imag-
ined as a “discursive arenas in which the norms that govern the communication are derived 
from local practices rather than an any idea of universal reasonableness or other criteria tradi-
tionally associated with public deliberation” (Vatnøy 2016, 123f). 
On social network sites such as Facebook, the generation of audience feedback serves another 
purpose: Through engaging the target group with messages and generating interaction, the 
posts issued by the institution are disseminated through the users’ personal networks (Van 
Dijck 2013, 17). In the case of the EU, this mechanism also enables strategic narratives to reach 
audiences across national borders (Price 2012, 14). Institutional social media strategies are 
hence premised on the bottom-up principle, but function as a hidden mechanism for dissemi-
nating political messages top-down (Serazio 2013, 98). Despite of the large audience, however, 
it is hard to evaluate the effect of institutional Facebook campaigns: The quantitative audience 
reach does not give information about the quality of reach (Vesnic-Alujevic 2012a, 36). 
There is an ongoing academic debate about the effect that professionalisation of political com-
munication has on the relationship between political actors and the public (Davis 2013, 135). 
As the description of today’s institutional social media campaigning shows, digitisation is a 
relatively new macro-institutional logic with considerable consequences for the public sphere 
(Aagaard 2016, 4). Supporters of promotion, particularly PR practitioners themselves, argue 
that promotion and democratic communication do not exclude one another (Davis 2013, 21ff). 
In their view, the audience-oriented symmetrical communication brings the public discourse 
closer to the normative deliberative ideals since it better reaches the citizens with information. 
At the same time, it makes political actors more responsive to the citizens’ needs (ibid). 
Critics of promotion on the other hand argue that through information management and pro-
motion, political content that enters the public sphere is biased and one-sided. Hence, the cre-
ation of legitimacy is not based on the truth, but on information made available with the ulti-
mate goal to convince others (Aronczky & Powers 2010, 11). According to McNair (2011, 23), 




is based is, or can be, manufactured artifice rather than objective truth”. Similarly, Peters (2010, 
5f) argues that strategic political communication always “has a connotation of twisted truth, if 
not propaganda”. Koc-Michalsk and Lilleker (2017, 1f) moreover point out that it does not 
make political actors more responsive as there is no bottom-up impact on the policy making. 
Instead, “controlled or faux interactivity is the norm in … political communication with little 
opportunity for influence and visitors required to work for the political actor or organization 
rather than work with them”. Hence, institutional social media campaigning makes use of mo-
bilising the citizens’ agency for promotional purposes while the control about the political 
messages stays with the political actor (Serazio 2013, 97).  
Taken together, the scope of promotional campaigns is limited for political institutions because 
they need to comply to normative standards. Nevertheless, audience feedback-based promo-
tional campaigns allow them to pre-select the published information and trick the audience into 
a controlled interactivity with the aim to disseminate the political message. A central question 
in the debate about the effects of institutional promotional social media campaign for the public 
sphere centres is if the bottom-up communication by the citizens has policy impact. To gain 
insights into how the EP has used social media and other forms of online citizen consultations 
in the past, the institutional communication of the EP will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.3. The European Parliament in social media 
In 2006, the European Commission published the White Paper on a European Communication 
Strategy, in which the EU’s democratic deficit was recognised for the first time (Ivic 2017, 82). 
Together with the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, it argued for “a shift from the 
EU as a project of the elite to the EU as a European citizens’ project” (Commission of the 
European Union 2006 as cited in Ivic 2017, 82f). The EP refers to the White Paper’s three 
principles in its fact sheet on the EU’s communication policy: (1) “Listening to the public, and 
taking their views and concerns into account”; (2) “Explaining how European Union policies 
affect citizens’ everyday lives”; and (3) “Connecting with people locally by addressing them 
in their national or local settings, through their favourite media” (European Parliament, Fact 
Sheets on the European Union. Communication Policy 2018, October). Next to numerous 
transnational citizen consultation initiatives that were launched in the name of Plan D (Hennen 




openness of the EU institutions as well as to a higher citizen participation in the decision-
making process through public dialogue (Michailidou 2010, 70).  
While the initial phase of the EP’s online communication strategy centred on the official Eu-
ropa-web pages (Michailidou 2010, 70), shortly before the European elections in 2009 the EP 
opened its first social media page on Facebook. Public pages for politicians were introduced 
on the platform after the US congressional elections in 2008 (Williams & Gulati 2012, 5). 
According to the former EP Communication Director Stephen Clark, however, the EP’s official 
Facebook page was the first one of a political institution within Europe, and worldwide 
(Vesnic-Alujevic 2012a, 38f). Ever since, the institution has joined all major social networking 
sites including Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram and LinkedIn.5 The aim has been to “not just to 
attract readers to our website, but to be where the people are. And people are on social media”.6  
According to several European public sphere scholars, social media has the potential to allow 
EU institutions to comply with the White Paper’s three principles and include the citizens in 
the European decision-making process. Valentini (2006, 89) argues that a two-way communi-
cation can improve the understanding between the EP and the citizens as it allows the EP to 
“take into account the EU publics’ needs and cultural values and their levels and types of in-
volvement and commitment”. Vesnic-Alujevic and Nacarino (2012, 68) write that if the citi-
zens are being listened to, an online space for “citizens-to-citizens deliberation and political 
dialogue could contribute to an increase in political participation". Furthermore, Meriläinen 
and Vos (2010, 2) suggest that social networks allow for a pan-European debate having the 
potential to create new publics without temporal, spatial and status-related restrictions. Michai-
lidou (2010, 68) adds that in social media the genuine voice of the EU institutions can be heard.  
Until today, there have been only a few studies investigating the reach and success of the EP’s 
political online dialogues (Hennen 2016, 40; Vesnic-Alujevic 2016b, 194). This can be ex-
plained with two reasons: First, in their historical review of EU communication research, Mül-
ler, Reckling and Weiß (2014, 6ff) identify a prevalent research focus on the mass media arena 
and attest to general shortcomings in research of top-down communication by EU officials. 
Secondly, institutional communication research has mostly focussed on the Commission as 
                                               
5 European Parliament. The social network at a glance. Retrieved January 26, 2019 from http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/external/html/socialmediaataglance/default_en.html 






“the EU’s official voice” (Michailidou 2010, 66) and to a lesser extent on the Council. The EP 
on the other hand has not drawn a lot of attention (Laursen & Valentini 2014, 2). If it is re-
searched, however, studies most often deal with the relationship between journalists and EP 
party officials (ibid, 4). Research on institutional officials or their campaign strategies directed 
to the EU citizens – who are next to journalists, national governments and interest groups one 
of the four major key publics – are still rare (ibid; Valentini 2013, 10).  
In the following section, I will first explain the particular conditions under which the suprana-
tional EU institutions’ civil servant communicators operate and subsequently present findings 
on the EP’s institutional communication. 
 
3.3.1. The European Parliament’s communication challenges 
Even more than national political institutions, the EU institutions face limitations when it 
comes to their communication because of the sui generis character of the EU’s polity. Accord-
ing to Valentini (2006, 80), the EU’s institutional communication is therefore characterised by 
a promotional dilemma for the following reasons: First, their scope of influence is broader 
since the EU comprises 28 member states. Thus, they need to communicate in a multi-cultural 
and multi-linguistic environment. Secondly, the EU polity consists of a combination of public 
institutions with different political agendas, which leads to a fragmentation of the EU’s insti-
tutional communication (ibid). The need to create legitimacy in various member states thus 
goes together with variables that make coherent and effective communication difficult 
(Meriläinen & Vos 2010, 3, 9).  
Next to the promotional dilemma, Laursen and Valentini (2014, 5) identify two main chal-
lenges for the EU’s institutional communication. First, there is the civil servant challenge. It 
describes the tension that derives from two needs: to comply with the media’s new values such 
as sensation, relevance or conflict to receive news coverage and at the same time to live up to 
the normative principles of a public sector organisation. In terms of communication, these in-
clude objectivity, transparency and factuality. The scope of possibility for strategic selection 
of information is hence limited for the EU civil servants. Secondly, the EU communication 
officials face the national media challenge. It derives from the fact that journalists and editors 
in different countries find different aspects of EU news newsworthy, which requires the adap-




though defined by in the context of the EU’s institutional press relations, both challenges are 
also true for online communication. In the case of the EP’s social media communication, the 
national media challenge is reflected in the existence of multiple, member state-based Face-
book pages featuring country specific content in the national languages.  
The co-existing of multiple institutions can explain why each institution is given a specific role 
in the EU’s institutional communication framework. The specific role of the EP’s communica-
tion is stated as the following:  
As in previous years, Parliament intends to keep citizens informed about the 2019 elec-
tions and their importance for the future of Europe. The institutional communication 
action is non-partisan and will run in support of the political parties’ and candidates’ 
individual campaigns. As it is non-partisan, it will focus on what the EU and Parliament 
have achieved and not on what they ought to achieve. (European Parliament, Fact 
Sheets on the European Union: Communication Policy 2018, October). 
The politically neutral, informative and retrospective approach to communication aiming at 
raising awareness about the European elections and the EP’s and EU’s past accomplishments 
that is described in the statement reflects the additional communication challenges the EP in 
particular is facing: First and as mentioned in the statement, as an institution without a con-
sistent political agenda, the EP’s institutional administration’s communication must be a-polit-
ical, non-aligned and represent the voice of all the different parties, MEPs and the EP’s Presi-
dent (Valentini 2013, 7f). Secondly, its political decision-making process is lengthy and com-
plex and it lacks competences in several key policy areas, which are able to draw public atten-
tion, such as defence (Anderson & McLeod 2004, 898). These two challenges might be, next 
to its non-partisanship, another reason for a retrospective coverage of the institution’s work 
and the focus on achievements. As a result, however, the orientation towards events has the 
potential to attract journalistic interest (Martins et al. 2012, 308).  
 
3.3.2. Findings on the European Parliament’s institutional communication  
While the online communication of the EP has not been extensively studied, its social media 
communication has been explored even less (Hennen 2016, 40). Hence, I will first present 
findings regarding the EP’s press work and media relations because they offer insights into the 
general conditions under which the EP’s communication is produced. Hence, they have impli-
cations for the EP’s social media campaigning today. Subsequently, I present studies that have 




Press work and media relations 
Several scholars have criticised the institutions’ press services for their reactive communication 
and incapability to adjust themselves to the logic of the media and ascribed to them at least part 
of the responsibility for their low visibility in public media (for example, Meyer 1999). 
Amongst the problems for correspondents are the complexity and technical nature of the press 
releases and the heavy volume of information released every (Martins et al. 2012, 305f).  
Research showed that during the last two decades, the EP has adapted mediatisation on an 
organisational level by granting press work a bigger meaning and expanding personnel and 
financial resources (Laursen & Valentini 2015, 2). Laursen and Valentini (2015, 35f) also 
found that the press officers pre-select interesting topics from the institutional agenda and stra-
tegically target multipliers, so EU-expert journalists from influential media. Valentini (2013, 
11) moreover recognised that EP has diversified its communication efforts, for example, by 
seeking cooperation with civil societies to disseminate information through other channels that 
might be closer to the citizens. According to Meyer (2009, 1050), shifting the attention and 
resources to most publicised topics, promote good and de-emphasise bad news, reducing the 
own vulnerability through stricter gate-keeping and professionalising the communication are 
clear signs of mediatisation. Even though according to findings by Martins et al. (2012, 316), 
the EP’s press services are judged as more media-friendly than the Commission’s equivalents 
by journalists, the professionalisation has also negative impacts: The journalist perceive the 
promotional nature of the press releases and consider them as “bad to find the truth” (ibid, 313). 
Studies based on interviews with the civil servants that work in the Directorate-General for 
Communication reveal continuous deficiencies in the EP’s press work. Martins et al. (2012, 
312) found that the press releases are still rather technical. Moreover, the press officials feel 
restricted by the institutional normative standards, which make it harder to write attractive press 
releases (ibid, 313). Anderson and McLeod (2004, 902) discovered that the press officers feel 
that the EP’s press services are underfinanced because the MEPs, who decide upon the EP’s 
administrative budget, see themselves and the Commission as main communicators. Conse-
quently, the inquiry uncovers a rivalry between the institutions, who “steal all of the ‘glory’ 
concerning EU policy successes for themselves.” (ibid, 898). Years later, Martin et al. (2012, 
314) found that especially the Commission is perceived as a competitor for media attention by 
the EP press officials. Moreover, the EP officials perceive it as exclusively their task to organ-




reported that the EP officials “have their focus on EP and not to care much about the legitimacy 
and reputation of the EU as such”. The studies hence show a continuously fragmentation in the 
EU’s institutional communication.  
Valentini (2006, 83f, 89), who investigates the EP top-down communication from an institu-
tional PR perspective (see also Valentini 2008, 2013), claims the one-way persuasive press 
agentry model of public communication has failed mobilise the citizens to seek information 
and politically participate. Valentini (2013) criticises that the EP’s main goal is to provide 
transparency about its activities to the public and points out a lack of image management and 
promotional campaigns to commit the citizens to the EU cause. According to her, only the 
involvement of the public in political processes through a two-way symmetrical model of com-
munication can lead to higher willingness to participation on the EU-level. 
 
Online communication 
Online communication has become more important for the EP since the number of Brussels 
correspondents has begun to decline since the beginning of the 2000s (Anderson, McLeod 
2004, 903). As a consequence, the EP has implemented several web sites, social media pages 
and public online consultation platforms such as the Citizens Agora, which connects citizens 
with MEPs on web and social media pages. Regarding the European public sphere, Hennen 
(2016, 24) argues that “an active public sphere is in the need of active and participating citizens, 
who interact with each other and express their demands, fears and attitudes towards the political 
institutions and authorities”. Even though the use of English on the EP’s web and social media 
pages has been criticised as exclusive (Koskinen 2013, 88), it can be argued that they poten-
tially offer a space for a top-down communication open to a large share of EU citizens. 
Valentini (2013) reviewed all studies that were conducted on EU online discussion platforms, 
including the EP’s Citizens Agora. She found low participation rates and a general lack of 
interest on behalf of the public to engage the EU’s online consultations. She concluded that the 
potential to build up a relationship between the citizens and the EU through reciprocal and open 
exchange was not realised. Tomkova (2010) showed that the Citizens Agora was largely with-
out political influence in the complex policy making process and open only for pre-selected 
civil society groups. While no such findings for the Citizens Agora exist, a study by Winkler, 




in Europe were dissatisfied with the lack of transparency regarding its political impact. It can 
be assumed that the same is true for participants of the EP’s consultation. 
Vesnic-Alujevic (2012a) explored the EP’s Facebook election campaign for the European elec-
tions in 2009 and found that the institution used the social network to inform and mobilise 
potential voters with entertaining and persuasive messages. Due to the large number of funny 
pictures, she concludes that the EP’s Facebook communication was mainly targeted at a 
younger audience. Meriläinen and Vos (2010), however, investigated the potential of the EP’s 
websites and social media channels to commit the youth to the EU cause. They showed that 
from the young citizens in Finland, particularly those who are disappointed with the EU do not 
visit the EP’s web or social media pages such as EuroparlTV and can hence hardly be reached 
through social media. The findings are in accordance with another study by Vesnic-Alujevic 
(2012b), which showed that the most important motivation to follow the EP or an EP party 
group on Facebook is to get information or to express support. The average follower is hence 
politically engaged and an “opinion maker”. Despite of that, only a small minority of 13% of 
the followers is interested in taking part in publics discussions on the EP Facebook page (ibid, 
468). Vesnic-Alujevic concluded that the best strategy for the EP communicators is to provide 
the opinion-makers with information, who will then disseminate the obtained information 
online or offline (ibid, 469). This suggestion is supported by findings by Mourao et al. (2015, 
3213), which showed that the more citizens know about the EU, the more they support it and 
that information consumed in social media generally fosters positive attitudes towards the EU.  
 
3.3.3. Discussion: Deliberation or promotion?  
Previous findings of the EP’s social media communication do not provide for coherent infor-
mation about the democratic potential of the institutional online communication. The study by 
Vesnic-Alujevic (2012a) suggests that at election times the EP Facebook page is mostly used 
as an information and mobilisation channel. Also, studies on the EP’s Citizens Agora have 
shown no bottom-up policy impact in the political process. Through the opaque nature of com-
munication, which is designed to look like involving citizens in the European decision-making 
process, Hennen (2016, 33) argues that “there is a danger that they are increasingly perceived 
as being rather a promotional instrument than serious attempts to engage the European citizenry 
in EU policy making”. Also, Valentini (2006, 80) argues that mainly “marketing communica-




A similar conclusion was made by Ivic (2017, 83), who explored the Commission’s strategic 
documents Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate. Ivic found that the strategy rather 
aims to inform citizens and to involve them in a debate than a deliberation. The strategic doc-
uments on the EU communication policy hence do not stipulate bottom-up policy impact. The 
citizens are hence not invited to politically participate but to interact with the EU institutions 
Jenkins and Carpentier (2013, 271). 
In the light of previous findings and the Commission’s guideline for the EU communication 
policy, one could assume that the EP’s social media pages are mainly top-down channels. But 
does that mean they are only about promotion and have no potential to enhance the European 
public sphere? Tomkova (2010, 274) argues that online interaction has democratic potential if 
all discussion participants, citizens and institutional actors, are equal and follow the normative 
rules of reflexivity and rationality. Top-down online communication can thus enhance the de-
liberative public sphere by making the citizens engage with political content and fosters a civic 
discussion culture, which then can lead to a deliberation in the offline world (ibid, 287). Also, 
Hennen (2016, 37) argues that even PR campaigns are a first step to create a European public 
sphere as they foster a pan-European audience. According to this view, promotion and demo-
cratic communication hence do not exclude each other. 
To assess if the social media communication of political institutions has democratic value, it 
would be important to investigate the motivations behind its production and the meaning as-
cribed to it within the institution. Several authors argue that in the discussion about the delib-
erative potential of institutional social media communication and its benefits for democracy at 
large, the attitude of promotional intermediaries is crucial (Aagaard 2016, 1; Martins et al. 
2012, 308). Yet, there has not been much research about the role that the European institutions 
are actively seeking in the construction of a European public sphere (Ivic 2017, 79). This study 
aims to contribute to closing that research gap by exploring the motivations behind the EP’s 
institutional Facebook communication from the perspective of the EP web communication of-
ficials. In the next Chapter, I will present the methodology used in this research. Subsequently, 








This study aims to explore the European Parliament’s social media communication as a possi-
ble answer to the European Union’s democratic deficit and the low voter turnout. In the re-
search at hand, I aim to find out what sense the staff members of the Web Communication 
(WebComm) unit at the EP’s Directorate-General for Communication make of their daily work 
practices and how communication is aimed to produce an added value to the European democ-
racy. The goal to offer a critical evaluation of the EP’s approach to Facebook communication 
guided by the normative criteria of deliberative public sphere.  
As a European institution, the EP is chosen because as the assembly of directly elected citizens 
representatives it constitutes the link between the EU governance and its constituency (Hennen 
2016, 29). The EP, to a higher degree than the other institutions, needs to demonstrate account-
ability and responsiveness to the citizens’ concerns as well as openness for criticism from the 
general public (ibid, 29f). Despite that, research about the EP’s communication in general and 
regarding its social media use is scarce (ibid, 40; Laursen & Valentini 2014, 2). If research into 
the EP’s social media communication exist, it captures the “election year effect” (Larsson 
2016, 283), so the increase of campaign activities at election time (for example, Vesnic-Aluje-
vic 2012a). A public deliberation as well as a promotional campaign, however, can be assumed 
to be permanently relevant. The study period is hence a bit more than one year before the 
upcoming European elections in May 2019 when the election campaigning had not yet begun. 
Through the study of ordinary events, however, “the status quo of a phenomenon can be re-
vealed and understood” (Mabry 2008, 5). 
As a social medium the social networking site Facebook is chosen. With 2.513.174 fans and 
2.473.681 subscribers7, the EP’s official Facebook page is its most popular social media page. 
As such, the page comes closest to providing the conditions for inciting a pan-European debate 
with popular inclusion, in contrast to Twitter, which is mostly used by socio-economic elites 
and journalists (Rieder et al. 2015, 5). With political communication defined as “purposeful 
communication about politics” (McNair 1995, 4), the EP’s official Facebook page can be con-
sidered to be a political deliberative forum. Based on the deliberative network theory, it can 
then be conceptualised as an online space which produces an online public (Vesnic-Alujevic 
                                               





& Nacarino 2012, 68). The size of the online public might exceed the numbers of active fol-
lowers as the posts can also reach Facebook users who do not actively follow the EP’s page.  
To assess the EP’s Facebook communications’ deliberative potential, it is important to take 
into account the views of the EP communication officials (Aagaard 2016, 2). In the European 
public sphere research, qualitative interviews have been used to explore the conditions under 
which the EP’s institutional communication is produced (for example, Anderson & McLeod 
2004; Martins et al. 2012; Laursen & Valentini 2015). Only a few studies, however, have em-
ployed participant observation to verify and contextualise their interview findings. The study 
at hand is hence based on participatory observation in the EP Web Communication unit and 
eight semi-structured in-depth interviews with EP web communication officials. The research 
questions that will guide the following analysis and inform the final discussion of the EP’s 
Facebook communication’s deliberative potential are thus:  
RQ: How do the members of the EP’s Web Communication unit make of the institutional 
communication on the official EP Facebook?  
SRQ: How do the members of the EP’s Web Communication unit perceive their own role from 
the perspective of the European public sphere?  
 
4.1. Research design 
This research employs a qualitative interview analysis. Qualitative research method are most 
suitable for explorative research aiming to gain an in-depth understanding of an not yet well 
understood social phenomenon (Mabry 2008, 4). In contrast to quantitative sciences, qualita-
tive research hence offers a “first-order understanding” of a phenomenon of interest (Brink-
mann 2013, 23). As common in constructivist qualitative research, the research process in this 
study is hence inductive. The research questions as well as the findings are however mediated 
by theory (Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton & Ormston 2013, 12).  
While quantitative methods are often perceived as more objective and non-reactive, a major 
advantage that qualitative research offers is that it is methodologically more flexible (Bryman 
& Buchanan 2018, 4f). Qualitative research allows the researcher to improve the design while 
the data collection process is ongoing, which can produce knowledge gains and an added value 




the researcher, however, interpretative research is prone to distortion due to factors such as 
biased case selection, informal research designs, subjective conclusions and non-replicability 
(Gerring 2011, 1136). The researcher can avoid distortion by documenting the research process 
thoroughly and being open about the research interest and motives (ibid).  
The following analysis is based on a critical constructivist stance (Hopf 1998, 181). The theo-
retical assumptions is that reality is a social phenomenon, which can only be grasp through 
socially constructed meanings. Those are not universal but depend on factors such as time, 
place and social context. Its epistemology is interpretivism, which assumes that in order to 
understand the social reality, both, the research objects as well as the researcher’s understand-
ing are required. Because the researcher cannot be free from his own prejudices and values, the 
research findings cannot be value free. 
 
4.2. Data collection 
The data corpus for this study consists of two data sets: first, a set consisting of field notes 
through participant observation in the EP’s WebComm unit and secondly, a set of data gener-
ated through eight semi-structured in-depth interviews with communication officials working 
with the EP’s official Facebook page.  
The data was collected during a study visit in the EP’s administration from 19 to 28 February 
2018. The EP offers study visits with the maximum of one month with the aim to “provide 
citizens aged 18 or over with opportunities for more detailed study of specific subjects relating 
to European integration”.8 The study visit was conducted in DG COMM’s WebComm unit. 
DG COMM “communicates the political nature of the institution and the work carried out by 
its Members”9. It comprises directorates for media, campaigns, liaison offices, visitors and re-
sources. The unit WebComm is located in the Directorate for Campaigns. It comprises web 
editors, social media editors and audio-visual producers. Each social medium is assigned a 
team. The unit hence comprises a “Facebook Team”, a “Twitter Team”, an “Instagram Team” 
and so forth. Most members of the unit can work in one or more of these teams.  
                                               
8 European Parliament: Study visits. Retrieved on October 29, 2018 from http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/at-your-service/en/work-with-us/study-visits 





The EP’s Facebook Team (FB Team) manages the official EP Facebook page. The page is 
managed from Brussels and its language is English, while the European Parliament Information 
Offices (EPIO) in the member states manage country-specific Facebook pages in other EU 
languages. The content of both kind of pages differs slightly as the member state-based pages 
often publish country-specific content, while the central page is purposefully pan-European.  
The EP Facebook page’s most important feature is the news feed on which at least two posts 
are published daily. The posts always include a short paragraph of written information as well 
as a photo or a video and a link to further information about the post’s topic on the EP website. 
Usually, the content informs the reader about the EP’s institutional agenda, votes or resolutions 
but occasionally also about European matters in general. Under each post, Facebook users can 
comment. The comments are subject to a moderation policy, which is published on the page. 
The page has links to the EP information centre website, the EP website, the political groups 
and the MEPs, amongst others. Moreover, all EP reports and resolutions are uploaded.  
 
4.2.1. Data set 1: Participant observation 
During the first week of the study visit (February 19-23, 2018), I used participants observation 
to gain understanding of internal working procedures. Participant observation is a qualitative 
research method where the researcher participates in everyday life of the study objects with the 
objective to learn about it (Zahle 2017, 467). It hence differs from outsider observation through 
the active participation of the researcher (ibid). The lived experiences are captured through 
constant observatory fieldnotes (Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce, Taylor 2012, xiv). 
During my field research as a participant observer in the EP’s WebComm unit, I was assigned 
an office desk, a computer, an email address. I also got a user name with which I could access 
internal servers with shared folders and documents. Even though I was not supposed to copy 
them or use them in this analysis, I was able to review the documents to get information about 
the internal approach to communication. I constantly compared them with the posts that have 
been published on the EP’s official Facebook page in the week during a study visit. 
In addition, I was involved in the execution of working tasks. For example, I assisted in a live 
video production of an interview with MEP and Vice-Chair of the Special Committee on Fi-
nancial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Ana Gomes, which was broadcasted on Fa-




I experienced the application of internal rules and guidelines for the institutional online com-
munication in practice. Most importantly, however, I attended two weekly meetings of the FB 
Team. In these, the members went through the weekly schedule, assigned tasks and talked 
about the general strategy. Here, I got a comprehensive overview over the FB Team’s work. 
During my participant observation, I took observatory field notes. These informed the inter-
view questions. In addition, I included question about two extraordinarily popular Facebook 
posts that were published during the time of my study visit into the interview questionnaire. 
 
4.2.2. Data set 2: Semi-structured interviews 
The second data source in this study is eight semi-structured in-depth face-to-face interviews 
conducted with members of the WebComm unit of the EP’s DG COMM in Brussels. A semi-
structured interview is a method to gain insights into the experiences and sense-making of the 
interviewees with the aim to interpret the subjective descriptions (Brinkmann 2013, 21). In 
contrast to fully structured interviews, semi-structures interviews have the advantage of allow-
ing follow-up questions. They hence offer the opportunity to further investigate new and un-
anticipated topics brought up by the interviewee (Mabry 2008, 7f).  
The interview questionnaire was developed based on the literature presented in this thesis and 
insights of the participant observation gained during the study visit. The questions are primarily 
directed at personal sense-making of the WebComm unit’s working practices but also target 
the personal attitudes of the interviewees to the social media use of public institutions in gen-
eral. As described in earlier, qualitative research allows the improvement of the research design 
during the process to produce additional value for the study (Brinkmann 2013, 46f; see Ch. 
4.1). Therefore, several questions based on unexpected topics and angles that have been 
brought up in the interviews have been added to the questionnaire during the data collection. 
Hence, not all study participants have asked the same questions. 
During the interviewing, I employed interview techniques that would penetrate variations in 
the responses (Kvale 2007, 74f). This is important in elite-interviews in order to avoid prepared 
talk tracks (ibid, 70). Next to asking open question, I presented the interviewees extraordinary 
popular or controversial Facebook posts published on the EP Facebook page and asked for 
explanations of their meanings (see Appendix). I also rephrased criticism on their work from 




Moreover, I stimulated confrontations between different narratives by requesting the interview-
ees to establish an order of importance of three given categories (ibid, 74). The interviews were 
conducted individually as they touched upon potentially sensitive topics such as the evaluation 
of working practices or personal attitudes, which required discretion (Brinkmann 2013, 27). 
The sampling method included two stages. First, the members of the FB Team were chosen by 
purposive sampling because of their expertise, knowledge and experience regarding the re-
search object. Expert sampling is especially useful in new research areas or cases with a lack 
of observational evidence (Etikan, Sulaiman, Abubakar & Rukayya 2016, 3). Secondly, apart 
from the Head of Unit, with whom I agreed on an interview appointment upon arrival, the 
research objects were chosen by convenience sampling. The method is common in elite or 
expert interviews where the availability at a given time and the willingness to participate usu-
ally determine who is included in the study (Etikan et al. 2016, 1). Thus, I send an interview 
request to the whole FB Team and conducted interviews with those who replied to my email. 
I conducted eight interviews in the second week of the study visit (26.-28.02.2018). All in all, 
292 minutes of interviews have been recorded with each having an average duration of 37 
minutes. Based on different degrees of decision-making power in the unit, I distinguish be-
tween the Head of Unit, the Chair of the FB Team and the remaining six general members of 
the FB Team in the analysis (see Table 1). 
 
 Interviewee Interview date Time Duration 
1. Head of Unit (HU) Wed, 28.02.2018 10:08-10:24 16 min. 
2. Chair of the FB Team (CFT) Tue, 27.02.2018 17:04-17:36 32 min. 
3. FB Team member 1 (FT1) Mon, 26.02.2018 15:10-15:46 36 min. 
4. FB Team member 2 (FT2) Tue, 27.02.2018 10:33-11:01 28 min. 
5. FB Team member 3 (FT3) Tue, 27.02.2018 14:27-15:23 56 min. 
6. FB Team member 4 (FT3) Tue, 27.02.2018 15:34-16:13 39 min. 
7. FB Team member 5 (FT5) Wed, 28.02.2018 11:11-11:49 38 min. 
8. FB Team member 6 (FT6) Wed, 28.02.2018 14:42-15:29 47 min. 




4.3. Data analysis 
The interviews were transcribed and systematically analysed. As an analytical tool, the posi-
tioning triangle was used. It stems from the positioning theory, a theoretical framework devel-
oped by Davies and Harré (1990) and Harré and van Langenhove (1991). The theory is located 
in the realm of social constructionism and able to grasp the discursive construction of meaning 
(van Langenhove & James 2017, 7; Brinkmann 2017, 134). Its aim is to overcome the static 
perception of social roles by exploring the fluid conditions of social interaction and the context-
specific characteristics of power (Dennen 2011, 529). 
The concept of ‘positioning’ was initially used in marketing to analyse the position of a product 
in a market (James 2011, 93). Because of its ability to grasp power relations, it has recently 
gained increasing popularity social research (van Langenhove & James 2017, 8). It has been 
applied in international relations research (for example Slocum & van Langenhove 2003; Slo-
cum-Bradley 2008; Moghaddam & Harré 2010) and media and communication studies (for 
example Weizman 2008; Leitch & Motion 2010; Miller 2013; Wise & James 2013).  
In the following, I will first outline the basic assumptions of position theory before discussing 
its application in the context of strategic communication. 
 
4.3.1.  Positioning theory as a social constructionist theory 
Positioning theory conceives the world as a socially constructed normative order. It builds on 
the assumption that context-specific and discursively established norms expressed as rules, 
policies or tradition shape social action by limiting what is possible and socially acceptable 
(Harré & Maghaddam 2003, 5; Davies & Harré 1999, 3). The concept of a position in a nor-
mative order is hence used to describe the scope of acceptable actions (van Langenhove 2011, 
67). The positioning theory assumes that as norms, positions in a moral order are socially con-
structed. Through a narrative process called positioning actors ascribe to themselves and others 
certain rights and duties in the community and establish relationships between the oneself and 
another (Tirado & Gálvez 2007, 231f). Positioning theory perceives all actors as active agents 
in the construction of social reality. The positioning narratives are hence always strategic in 
the sense that they take into account the interest of oneself or the group (Tirado & Gálvez 2007, 




Once a position in a moral order is accepted, each individual interprets the social reality through 
it and acts strategically according to the norms ascribed to it. However, positions are continu-
ally renegotiated as both of their determinants are subjects to constant change (Dennen 2011, 
529). The first determinant are positions occupied by other group members. If one member 
loses the right to an action, another one gets it. The rights and duties ascribed to different actors 
are hence indefinitely linked (Harré & Maghaddam 2003, 9). All in all, positioning is hence a 
discursive construction of meaning based on shared beliefs. It is carried out in everyday life 
amongst members of a group and characterised by constant affirmations, contestations and 
confusions (Boston 2015, 135). The second determinant are group-specific shared normative 
presuppositions of norms and social hierarchies (Harré & Maghaddam 2003, 9). They are sus-
tained through so-called speech acts or actions. Every action contains an ideological meaning, 
through which norms, values and the social order are constantly reproduced (Tirado & Gálvez 
2007, 243f).  
 
4.3.2. Positioning theory’s analytical tool in communication  
The positioning theory’s analytical tool, the positioning triangle, was created by Harré and 
Maghaddam (2003) in the context of psychology. It is however able to expand the interpersonal 
context for multiple applications. One such application is the study of the intergroup context 
of political actors, such as institutions, whose “rights and duties to perform certain categories 
of speech acts are restricted by the conventions of interaction” (Harré & Maghaddam 2003, 5).  
An analytical tool based on the positioning theory for the study of strategic communication 
was developed by James (2011). Aiming to analyse commercial or institutional PR campaigns, 
it draws heavily upon the original analytical framework, but focusses on the intentional posi-
tioning of public actors. As this analysis deals with the EP’s strategic Facebook communica-
tion, it will be based on James’ positioning approach for strategic communication. 
The first analytical dimension in James’ (2011) positioning approach is the original positioning 
triangle (Harré & Maghaddam 2003). It is a framework to conduct a discursive analysis along 
three categories: position, act and story line.  
(1) In the context of PR, James (2011, 101) defines a position as “the entity’s point of view 
of its own and stakeholders’ actual and potential positions”. As subjective viewpoints, posi-




position entails “a cluster of rights and duties to perform certain actions” (Harré & Maghad-
dam 2003, 5f). Brinkmann (2010, 258) suggests defining a position by identifying ‘oughts’. 
For example, an EP communication official might say “I ought to provide media relations 
training to the MEPs”. As part of a bigger narration, this statement could position the official 
as a professional communication expert, a civil servant supporting the political actors of the 
institution as well as a relevant actor in the construction of a European public sphere. 
(2) A speech act is “the entity’s course of action chosen from among various possibilities” 
(James 2011, 101). In practice, this means that each communicative action has a purpose such 
as to inform, to justify or to persuade. It aims to trigger a consequence through which the 
entity’s desired position can be achieved (ibid, 102). Central to the analytical dimension is to 
interpret each action as “socially meaningful and significant performance” (Harré & Maghad-
dam 2003, 6) because they are linked to the production of certain social order. The re-
searcher’s task is therefore to uncover the “illocutionary force” (James 2011, 102) of an ac-
tion or to identify the hidden ideological meaning in words. Because it can be assumed that 
the interviews are performative and the interviewees tried to adjust their messages to align 
with the existing public image, deconstructive reading is necessary to analyse the speech acts 
(Brinkmann 2017, 126). It is not a clearly defined method, but its aim is to dismantle the 
concepts expressed in a text and open it up for construction of new understanding by reveal-
ing its hidden, excluded or opposing meanings (O’Shaughnessy & Baines 2009, 232).  
 (3) A story line describes the “entity[’s] attempts to construct meaning through storylines 
about the position it has declared” (James 2011, 103). In strategic communication, this hap-
pens through narratives (ibid). Identifying and interpreting story lines is thus tantamount with 
a narrative analysis. This is a method that takes into account the meaning and language of a 
text and focuses on the story that is told by an interviewee (Kvale 2007, 112). The story does 
not need to be visible as such, it can be constructed by several disconnected passages of the 
interview. Most importantly, narrative analysis can be performed as reconstruction of a main 
narrative of a number of interviews (ibid). The story line analysis will therefore be employed 
to identify the hegemonic narratives in the FB Team’s accounts.  
According to the positioning triangle, story lines are usually consistent with the positionings 
and speech acts (James 2011, 103). They are however open to interpretation (Brinkmann 
2010, 258). For example, the EP’s communication officials could argue that managing the 




European public because English is Europe’s lingua franca. Another person could argue that 
English excludes vast parts of the population and that the practice goes against the EU’s 
democratic language policy.  
In addition to the positioning triangle, James’ (2011, 103f) positioning approach contains three 
more analytical dimensions for analysing positioning strategies in public relations. The posi-
tioning type distinguishes if the position an organisation advocates through a campaign is taken 
deliberatively or defensively, which is “central to the purposive construction of meaning with 
the strategic intention of an organization achieving its goals.” (van Langenhove & James 2017, 
13). The positioning purpose, thus a promotional campaign’s purpose, differentiates between 
intimidation, self-promotion, exemplification and supplication (James 2011, 103f). The posi-
tioning goal determines the objective of the campaign (van Langenhove & James 2017, 12). 
 
Figure 1: Positioning framework for strategic communication after James (2011)  
The positioning framework developed by James (2011) is an especially useful analytical tool 
for the research at hand. The first research questions ask for the EP communication officials’ 
sense-making of the institutional communication on Facebook and their self-ascribed role from 
the perspective of the European public sphere. An analysis along the positioning triangle allows 
insights into “the ways people do things and the meanings and normativities ascribed to what 
they do” (Brinkmann 2017, 134). An analysis along the positioning triangle thus allows in-
sights into the EP communicators’ group identity, how they move within the boundaries be-




they claim in relation to the citizens and other actors. Moreover, instead of exploring a static 
role of the EP officials, the positioning approach gives insights in which forces shape that role 
in significant ways. As explained in Chapter 3.3.1., institutional communication is produced in 
the crossroad of the tensions deriving from the duty to comply with normative standards and 
to attract attention to the institution through professionalised promotional communication. Ad-
ditionally, the public representation of the institution can be affected by societal changes such 
as new public demands for accountability, an increasing competition for attention, changes in 
the field of communication and a pressure to adapt to innovations, new legislation or changes 
in the norms normative order (Aagaard 2016, 2). With an interview analysis, using the posi-
tioning triangle, the researcher can determine which conditions impact the actions of an insti-
tution. Finally, the positioning theory is particularly useful to approaches to online communi-
cation as it naturally comprises a separate social realm defined by the members, affordances 
and algorithms of the platform (Tirado & Gálvez 2007, 232). 
 
4.3.3. Application of the method 
Based on the positioning framework developed by James (2011) a qualitative textual analysis 
was conducted. The aim is to extract collective narratives that give sense and legitimise work 
practices. Even though the Facebook Team is regarded as a unit with a shared social reality, 
opposing narratives will be taken into account in the interpretation of the findings as they can 
uncover discrepancies in the collective sense-making. They can hence signify windows of op-
portunities for changes of institutional practices (Brinkmann 2017, 122). Selected data extracts 
displaying opposing narratives will be analysed in more detail. 
The qualitative interview analysis was conducted as the following: First, the interviews were 
transcribed and repeatedly reviewed to gain familiarity with the data. During that process, I 
constantly compared my impressions with the participant observation’s field notes as well as 
with the theoretical background literature. The reflections of this process were noted as memos.  
Secondly, the interview data was read into the programme ATLAS.ti, which assisted the anal-
ysis. Based on the memos, I developed initial categories and codes. Following James’ (2011) 
conceptual framework suggestion, first the positioning of the self and others were defined. To 
do so, I identified and coded the relevant actors in the narrations. Based on the coded quotations 




the interview questionnaire mainly concerned the work of the Facebook Team, the amount of 
information about the team was naturally way larger than the amount dealing with the other 
actors. Hence, the coding process for the self-positioning of the Facebook Team was more 
differentiated. Because positions can be grasp through rights and duties, I coded the rights and 
duties the Facebook Team ascribed itself. Based on the coded quotes, I deducted a collective 
narration (self-positioning).  
Next, the EP officials’ concrete actions relevant to their Facebook communication (speech 
acts) were defined. Because the aim of analysing speech acts is to uncover the hidden meaning, 
the work practices as well as their purposes were coded (for example, “Mobilising engagement 
– Inciting a discussion”; “Mobilising engagement – Network effect”; “Mobilising Engagement 
– Audience Feedback”).  
In a third step, the main narratives that give the Facebook Team’s work meaning and legitimise 
its actions and self-positioning (story lines) were coded. During the initial data observation and 
the previous coding process, I identified narratives centring on the following key words: “de-
mocracy”, “promotion”, “opportunity” and “competition”. Because the narratives are con-
sistent with the positions and speech acts, I reviewed each speech act and position coded and 
assigned it the narrative it is legitimised with. That way, I was able to improve the narratives 
in my memos. In a next step, I tested each narrative’s applicability on each interview. When 
all interviews supported the narrative, I coded quotes that touched upon or summarised the 
narrative.  
 
4.4.  Validity, ethics and reflections 
In this last section of the chapter, I discuss how the ethical conduct of this study was ensured, 
with which procedures its validity was enhanced as well as limitations of the research findings.  
To ensure ethical conduct, I followed the four principles created by Diener and Crandall (1978 
as cited in Bryman 2012, 135). These include avoiding harm as well as the invasion of privacy 
of the research objects, obtaining informed consent and excluding deception. From these prin-
ciples, especially the avoidance of privacy invasion poses a challenge to qualitative research-
ers, who aim to gain in-depth insights into the attitudes and motivations of others because the 
research will be published (Hammersley & Traianou 2012, 106). I followed the principles by 




publish their work titles and transcribed interview experts. I also protected the interviewees 
identities by not revealing personal information apart from the working positions. Moreover, I 
protected the interviewees’ privacy by not asking personal, political or controversial questions.  
In qualitative interviewing, validity refers to how well the findings inform the actual study 
object (Kvale 2007, 122). Complete validity cannot be verified, particularly in semi-structured 
interviews, where the researcher attains a broader role in the knowledge production than in 
fully structured interviews (Brinkmann 2013, 21). However, the validity can be enhanced 
through the compliance with scientific quality criteria (Drost 2011, 114). 
The internal validity focusses on the research design (Drost 2011, 115). Here, one quality cri-
teria is that the sample is “true to life” (ibid, 114). In constructivist qualitative research, partic-
ipant observation and interviewing are recognised as the most suitable methods to gain an in-
depth understanding of the sense-making of the participants of social interactions (Constantino 
2008, 119). However, the nonprobability sampling of this study needs be discussed. Conven-
ience sampling is justified if the pool of potential study participants is a homogenous popula-
tion (Etikan et al. 2016, 2). Because this study assumes that social reality emerges from the 
discursive practices, including conversation and institutional practices, the Facebook Team 
does indeed constitute a homogenous population (Tirado & Gálvez 2007, 230). As a subject to 
the same institutional culture and work practices, it can be assumed that a homogenous sense-
making takes place in the unit. Besides, the aim of this study is to identify the most important 
collective narratives within the group. It can be assumed that the findings would not have been 
significantly different if a randomised sampling had been applied. Moreover, I want to address 
the proximity, which describes the “psycho-socio-emotional distance between researchers and 
the cases” (Mabry 2008, 10). Given the shortness of my study visit, I assume that there was no 
impact on the research findings. Furthermore, the combination of two data sets contributes to 
the internal validity of the study: While interviews are performative in nature, participant ob-
servations and the study of internal documents produces naturally occurring data, which can 
be used for the contextualisation of the findings (Karppinen & Hallvard 2012, 11; Paulus, 
Lester & Dempster 2014, 70). On the other hand, assessing research findings with practition-
ers’ perception also bring added value to a study and has therefore become an increasingly 
popular practice (Tenscher, Koc-Michalska, Lilleker, Mykkänen, Walter, Findor, Jalali, & 




Finally, even though in studies with an interpretative epistemology the truth of knowledge is 
secondary to the interpretation of the researcher, transparency about the construction of 
knowledge is required (Kvale 2007, 123f). This is provided through the interview questionnaire 
(see Appendix) and the description of the coding process with ATLAS.ti. However, a limitation 
to the findings is that the analysis is based on the author’s subjective interpretations of the data 
and can hence not be free from personal values and bias.  
The external validity of a study concerns the generalizability of the findings (Bryman 2012, 
69). According to van Langenhove and James (2014, 11), findings acquired with the position-
ing theory are not generalisable as they take into account the specific conditions under which 
meaning is produced. Rather, the results can offer ideas for further inquiry of different aspects 
of the social realm (ibid). Moreover, this study is only based on eight interviews, which are 
primarily concerned with Facebook. Its findings do hence not provide information about the 
work in the EP’s WebComm unit in general or how other social media channels are used. 
Furthermore, the study does not provide information about the EP’s DG COMM’s general 
institutional communication and its contribution to the European public sphere nor about the 
Facebook use nor the online communication of the other EU institutions. However, even 
though studies of relatively contained cases can never claim to fully represent the reality, they 
can, especially in comparison with similar studies from other authors, deliver a valuable con-







5.  Analysis 
This study aims to explore the European Parliament’s web communication staff’s sense-mak-
ing of its everyday work practices on the official EP Facebook page. In this Chapter, I conduct 
a qualitative text analysis of the interviews with EP communication officials based on James’ 
(2011) positioning theory framework for strategic communication. The aim is to reveal the 
motivations and the reasoning behind the civil servants’ communicative actions in order to be 
able to offer a critical assessment of the democratic potential of the EP’s institutional Facebook 
communication from the perspective of the European public sphere. 
The structure of the analysis is the following: First, I analyse with which narratives the EP Web 
Communication unit’s Facebook Team constructs its own role in the European public sphere. 
Since the narratives that define the role of other actors contribute to the narrative self-position-
ing of the FB Team, the analysis starts with the roles ascribed to the other actors that appear in 
the narrations (positioning). In a second step, I identify the most important narratives, which 
are used to reason specific actions in the framework of the FB Team’s citizen communication 
(speech acts). This analysis is accompanied by a critical interpretation attempting to decon-
struct the presented notions and to offer alternative interpretations. Finally, I summarise the 
grand narratives giving meaning to the EP’s Facebook communication (story lines). After the 
sense-making of the FB Team has been analysed, the EP’s Facebook campaign’s type, purpose 
and goal can be defined. Finally, the findings are critically discussed and a conclusion is drawn.  
 
5.1. Positioning analysis 
The interviews revealed that the FB Team’s self-identification and work practices are largely 
influenced by four groups of actors that are seen as relevant in the public discourse about the 
EP: (1) The EP as a political institution, (2) the citizens as the EP’s constituency, (3) the media 





Figure 2: Relevant actors in the public discourse about the EP with influence on the FB Team 
 
5.1.1. The European Parliament – a democratic change agent 
The EP is one of the most central actors of the narrations of the FB Team. It is seen as the 
assembly of citizen representatives and characterised by its legislative power, decisions and 
resolutions. These are to be represented by the FB Team, independent of the current political 
formation. 
The EP is perceived as a democratic institution that “is directly elected” (FT3) and does what 
the “Europeans want the EP to do” (FT4). As such, its decisions do indeed positively impact 
the lives of the people. 
Because of its power as a positive change agent, the EP is considered to be important. In fact, 
“important” is the most frequent adjective to describe the EP: It deals with “important issues” 
(FT5; FT2) and features “important debate(s)” (FT6). The adjective is also used to describe the 
European elections (HU), getting information about the elections (FT6), forming an opinion 
about the political parties (FT5; CFT) and voting in the elections (FT5; FT3). 
While the interviewees deliberately position the EP as democratic, powerful and hence an im-
portant political actor, they are aware of the discrepancy of how other actors position the insti-
tution. In the public discourse, the EP is met by a “lack of recognition” (FT4). According to 
the interviews, the term describes both, the EP’s lack of visibility as well as the adequate as-
sessment of its importance and benefits in the national news media. According to the inter-
viewees and as will be discussed later in more detail, the lack of information about the EP’s 




Interestingly, Meyer (2009, 1055) uses the same wording when he diagnoses the European 
Commission a “lack of recognition in different national contexts”. Even though it is difficult 
to evaluate the civil servants’ perception of the EP’s lack of recognition, empirical findings 
suggest that the claim is justified. While the EP receives regular news coverage at least in pro-
European countries, it shows also that the supranational parliament is often compared to its 
national counterparts, which results in a rather critical coverage (Gattermann 2013, 447).  
The positive description of the EP shows that the FB Team sees the institution as an important 
democratic power in Europe. It is repeatedly stressed that its legislation has solid benefits for 
the European people. Strikingly, however, a possible lack of legitimacy of the EP due to the 
low public support is not discussed. This can be explained by the output approach on legitimacy 
displayed in the interview, which continuously stress the EP’s benefits for the people. Output 
legitimacy describes legitimacy which is “judged in terms of the effectiveness of the European 
Union’s policy outcomes for the people“ (Schmidt 2012, 2). In contrast, the notion of input 
legitimacy is not measured by institutional performance, but “judged in terms of the EU’s re-
sponsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people“ (ibid). This stance 
is interesting insofar as in the academic debate, it is the output legitimacy in which the EU 
performs better than in the input legitimacy (ibid, 5). Several studies have shown that the civil 
servants take on output legitimacy is reflected in the EU institutional communication, which 
focuses mostly on presenting the benefits of legislative initiatives (Müller et al. 2014). 
It hence seems as if the output legitimacy is used as a rhetorical means in the EP’s institutional 
communication to increase the input legitimacy. At the same time, a lack of input legitimacy 
is if not denied at least left out of the narrations. As I will discuss later, the interviews reveal 
the view that the FB Team’s job is to inform and empower the citizens to take up the power 
that they are having to influence EU policies, rather than fixing an input legitimacy problem. 
This leads to the question if the interviewees indeed hold this opinion or if they stick to their 
role as promotional intermediaries.  
 
5.1.2. The citizens – the uninformed authority 
Next to the EP the most important stakeholder of the FB Team are the citizens. Indeed, the 
European people is depicted as the ultimate source of power in the EU and authority over the 




benefits from the institution. According to the interviews, the real benefits are returned to the 
citizens as legislation, but also include the right to information about the legislation and how 
the tax money is used. The FB Team’s civil servants hence work in the service of the people. 
While the theoretical concept of citizenship as the ultimate political authority is valued, the 
studied interviews represent a mixed depiction of the European people. Most of the interview-
ees stress that the citizens are poorly informed about the EU, the EP and its impact on their 
lives, even to the point “that many people do not even know it exists” (FT4).  
All interviewees directly or indirectly stress that citizens are not the ones to be blamed for their 
lack of information in regard to the EP. One interviewee, for example, takes her family as an 
example, which after years still thinks she works for the Commission because they do not that 
the EP exists. Using one’s family as a rhetorical means can be interpreted as an exonerating 
gesture. Another FB Team member puts herself into the role of an EU citizens: “For me, I am 
here, I know how it is, it does not feel [far away], but of course for the biggest part of people 
it does” (FT6). Since the citizens cannot experience first-hand the importance of the EP, they 
are just dependent on second-hand information. In the interviews, both the media and national 
governments are explicitly made responsible for the lack of information about the EP:  
(…) the money you are investing, gives you a return in investment. (…) You do not 
know it because your national governments and media and so on do not do the job of 
coming and telling you what it is worth. (FT5) 
Both actors are moreover implicitly blamed for a lack of information infrastructure. According 
to the interviewees, a large part of the citizenry is cut off from information about the EU be-
cause they cannot afford the overly expensive newspapers or because they lack internet access.  
The findings show that the communication officials aim to implement a strategic narrative that 
is able to construct a good relation between the EU citizens and the institution: By shifting the 
blame for the lack of awareness about the EP to national governments and media, the inter-
viewees purposefully take away responsibility from the citizens. This can be explained with 
interpretation of the citizenry as the most important stakeholder of the EP, including both the 
political authorities and the civil servants.  
A more critical notion of the citizens is however displayed regarding their willingness to polit-
ically participate on the EU-level. Several interviewees stress that citizens in a democracy do 
not only have rights, but also obligations. Accordingly, access to information obliges them to 




as passive, not actively reaching out for information about the EP. As a result, the FB Team 
must actively approach, inform and empower them to execute their rights and duties. 
Taken altogether, the FB Team’s view on the citizens is mixed. While perceived constraints on 
information about the EU prevents them from using their power in the political decision-mak-
ing process, they are concurrently not interested in a change to the status quo. Interestingly, 
other reasons for the citizens’ lack of interest or the low voter turnout in the elections other 
than the lack of information about the benefits of the EP are not discussed. Such other expla-
nations as the notion that dominant perceptions of democracy are still national (Salovaara-
Moring 2009, 10) or the insufficient, nationally-anchored campaigning of the EP’s political 
parties (Hix, Marsh 2007, 496) are not discussed. Indeed, the narrative centring on a lack of 
information appears to legitimise the EP’s strategy to actively approach, inform and enlighten 
the citizens so that they can execute their democratic rights. 
 
5.1.3. The media – elitist and old-fashioned 
According to the interviewees, the media plays a key role in the European public discourse and 
accordingly in the EP’s perceived lack of recognition. As gate-keepers to the public sphere, the 
media acts as “intermediaries” (FT2) between the EP and its constituency. Since important 
pan-European, EU-centred print or broadcasting media are non-existent, national media is seen 
to have the obligation to inform citizens about the EP. All interviewees believe that the news 
media does not fulfil this duty. 
According to several interviewees, national media often reports on EU affairs from a national 
angle and distorts the messages the EU press officers want to send to the public. Secondly, the 
media engenders a “scapegoat system” (FT5) by giving national public actors a platform to 
blame the EU institutions for decisions they had no part in. In comparison to the intergovern-
mental Council and the national parliaments, as well as to a lesser extent to the EC, the media 
gives very little attention to the EP in particular. Thus, the EP “may possibly end up being 
neglected” (FT4).  
Only one interviewee attempts to stand up for the media by explaining that the economic crisis 
in the news industry has resulted in the reduction of Brussels correspondents by even major 
newspapers, with smaller editorial offices not being able to cover European affairs anymore at 




that tax-funded public broadcasters from the most powerful and pro-EU member states are 
affected by the structural changes in the news sector.  
The occurrence of only a single opposing narrative to the hegemonic narration that the media 
is voluntarily refraining from covering European affairs is so far surprising as all interviewees 
have a background in social science or media and communication studies. Some of them have 
moreover worked in the news media before. In fact, the interviews show that also other inter-
viewees are aware of the news industry’s crisis. There is a consensus that the impact of the 
news media on the public discourse is continuously fading as social media has become increas-
ingly popular. Offline media is hence depicted as a relic of the past, forced to adapt to the new 
communication environment and distribute their editorial content through social media to catch 
the audiences’ attention. An interviewee for example states that “(…) newspapers are for peo-
ple above 40 and anyone below 40 simply do not read newspapers anymore. They do not watch 
the news on television anymore. They get the news from social media” (FT2).  
This one-sided negative assessment of the media’s willingness to perform as the Fourth Estate 
in the European public sphere can be interpreted as a form of self-legitimation. The lack of 
news coverage needs to be replaced by a more informative and sustainable form of communi-
cation – that is, institutional social media communication. Other reasons that are listed to justify 
the perceived need to substitute the news media are that socio-economically disadvantaged 
citizen cannot afford to buy newspapers and that the news media offers citizens mostly content 
that they either lack interest in or that is not easy to understand. In fact, research shows that 
these are in fact the reasons why journalists usually refrain from covering the EU: because the 
audiences are disinterested in it and lack the necessary background knowledge for in-depth 
information (de Vreese 2003, 162f). The argumentation on behalf of the FB Team is hence not 
consistent. It becomes increasingly clear that the techno-optimistic narrative that depicts the 
media as elitist and undemocratic is mainly strategic with a self-legitimising function.  
Taken together, the media is depicted as actively damaging to the EP’s public image. Moreo-
ver, they are described as elitist, undemocratic and not socially responsible. The stagnation of 
the mass media that characterises today’s fourth age of political communication (Aagaard 
2016, 5) and the media’s decreasing gatekeeping power are thus seen as a natural and positive 
development. The one-sided depiction of the news media, which only one interviewee some-




5.1.4. Public speakers – bullies, opportunists and competitors 
Throughout the interviews, several public speakers are ascribed to the EP’s current situation. 
In the following analysis, public speakers form one category because they occur sporadically, 
thus not being perceived as key actors. In addition, they comprise mainly political actors, 
whose status provides them entry into the public sphere. Despite being politicians, the public 
speakers are perceived and judged as communicators. 
The first group of public speakers are national government actors. According to the interviews, 
they contribute to the EP’s lack of recognition by not sufficiently informing the citizens about 
the benefits of the EU. Even worse, they strategically use the EU as a rhetoric means to shift 
responsibility for unpopular policy decisions away from themselves. Indeed, research confirms 
this observation (Meyer 2009, 1053). National governments, together with the media, are hence 
responsible for the perceived “scapegoat system” described in the previous section.  
Public speakers also include the MEPs in their roles as national politicians. Even as part of the 
same institution, the interviewees criticise the MEP’s in their role as ambassadors for the EP: 
When they speak to the media in their countries, they often do not even mention the EP, nor 
do they speak from a European perspective. The MEPs are thus perceived as being primarily 
concerned about their reputation amongst their national constituencies. Also, this observation 
is in accordance with literature that highlights the lack of incentives for MEPs to gain publicity 
in their role as EU citizen representative (Meyer 2009, 1053). As presented in Chapter 2.2.2., 
studies on the election campaigns by EP party groups moreover find that they rather focus on 
national issues (Hix & Marsh 2007, 506).  
Several interviewees also point to the naïve approaches of many MEPs to their social media 
presences, generally not understanding the importance of strategic. Already Anderson and 
McLeod’s (2004, 916) interviews with EP press officers displayed a dissatisfaction with the 
communication attempts made by the MEPs. Furthermore, research finds that also on the party-
level, fewer resources are invested in campaigning in the European elections than in national 
elections. This is because the EP elections are often regarded as second-order elections by the 
politicians (de Vreese 2009, 10, 15; Schuck et al. 2010, 41f). Because the European political 
parties are ultimately the actors who draw the attention of the citizens to European issues, some 
scholars assume that the EP’s political parties indeed carry a part of the responsibility for the 
lower voter turnout (Hix & Marsh 2007, 496). All these findings indicate that the FB Team’s 




Finally, the other EU institutions are also criticised in their role as public speaker. Even though 
it is recognised that also the Commission and, to a lesser degree, the Council are suffering from 
an inappropriate representation in the public discourse (FT5), the two other EU institutions are 
also positioned as potential competitors for visibility. Findings that showed up inter-institu-
tional rivalries are also made by Anderson and McLeod (2004, 911) and Laursen and Valentini 
(2015, 36). Altogether, they indicate a continuously fragmented approach and “polyphonic na-
ture” of the EU’s institutional communication (Valentini 2013, 7).  
It was shown that all three groups of public speakers mentioned in the interviews are charac-
terised as damaging for the EP’s public image. In the narrative the public speakers are hence 
closely connected to the media, which gives them a platform. Remarkably, two of the three 
groups entail EU actors, one of which even belongs to the same institution. NGOs or civil 
societies do not appear throughout the interviews. This leads to the conclusion that they are not 
considered as relevant for the public discourse about the EP. Interestingly, findings by Valen-
tini (2013, 11) made several years earlier showed that the EP’s communication officials coop-
erate with third sector organisation to spread their campaign messages. The interviews reveal 
that today, at least in the WebComm, instead of NGOs and civil society organisations, “influ-
encers” (FT3) are considered as important ambassadors for the EP. On Facebook, influencers 
are usually understood as “people with large networks of connected followers and friends” 
(Villi & Matikainen 2016, 112). The idea that selected individuals with professional social 
media presences are considered as more influential by the EP’s FB Team than third sector 
organisations demonstrates the promotional professionalisation of the WebComm Unit as well 
as its adaption to the logics of a new digitised attention economy in social media (Aagaard 
2016, 4). The cooperation with influencers will be discussed again at a later point.  
Because only one interviewee mentioned the cooperation with influencers, they are not in-
cluded in the list of relevant public actors. Equally, anti-democratic actors, such as “the far-
right and Russia” (FT5) are mentioned but are not perceived as actively harming the EP’s rep-
utation.  
 
5.1.5. Facebook – powerful and useful 
The interviews display two notions of Facebook: one as a medium which influences the public 




notion entails a more general description of social media and Facebook, the notion of Facebook 
as a tool is the basis for two narratives that reason how the FB Team uses the platform to reach 
European citizens.  
 
Facebook as a medium – a differentiated view  
Social media companies are an important group of actors in the narrations, which is obviously 
due to the fact that the interviewed communicators work primarily with social media platforms. 
While this research focuses on Facebook, it is also important to grasp the general approach to 
social media companies. It should be noted here that the interviews display strong interpersonal 
discrepancies in the assessment of their benefits and risks. Together, the interviews show a 
highly differentiated view on social media. All in all however, they are assessed mostly by the 
opportunities they offer and less by the risks they pose to the public discourse. 
The interviewees recognise that social media has become an important space for the public 
discourse as people consume less and less TV or newspapers: “50 years ago there was news-
papers and television and now you have Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat” (FT2). They also 
agree that Facebook offers a space for political discussion, which is why according to the Head 
of Unit, social media is just like traditional media. Communication on Facebook is thus seen 
as part of the public sphere and explicitly named as part of the “European public sphere” (FT2).  
Facebook is moreover described as an inclusive medium characterised by equality. It provides 
for a communicative space where “everyone can have a say” (FT2) and exchange views, even 
across national borders. Compared to traditional media, Facebook’s lower prices make it ac-
cessible for all citizens and a substitute source of information to those who do not consume 
newspapers (HU; FT5). Moreover, “citizens can comment on politicians’ opinions easier than 
in the past when watching someone in the television” (FT2). Thus, the perception is that “Fa-
cebook and social media in general are the least elitist medium” (CFT). 
The interviewees also mention Facebook’s low entrance barriers for public actors, who can use 
the platforms “to be heard in the public sphere in an easier way [than through the traditional 
media]” (FT2). Considering the disappointment with the media, a big benefit for the interview-
ees is the possibility to communicate “without intermediates” (FT6). For institutions such as 
the EP, Facebook is a “chance to give a different angle or approach to some facts to the public 




it easier to “connect with citizens and to go outside the walls of the institutions where citizens 
cannot look and that feels so far and distant from the real life” (FT6).  
The FB Team hence sees Facebook as an inclusive and equal discussion platform, which can 
connect citizens from different countries as well as the institution with the constituency. This 
description stands in sharp contrast with the one of traditional media, which is depicted as 
exclusive, elitist and undemocratic. What stands out is the general accordance with techno-
optimistic assumptions discussed in Chapter 3, for example that social media lead to an equal-
isation in the asymmetrical power relations between the citizens and political actors. Even more 
striking is the similarity to the empowerment and connectivity narratives that are advocated by 
Facebook itself (Nielsen & Vaccari 2013, 2334; Vesnic-Alujevic 2016, 423). According to 
CEO Zuckerberg, for example, the company’s official mission is “to make the world more 
open and connected” (Hoffmann et al. 2018, 214; see Ch. 3.1.4.). Facebook’s front page states: 
“Helps you connect and share with the people in your life”.10 Several authors argue that the 
propagation of these narratives centring on connectedness, empowerment and horizontal power 
relations is an attempt by professionals of the promotional industry to justify their work “that 
relies on techno-scientific utopia and imaginaries” (Vesnic-Alujevic 2016, 423; see also Aa-
gaard 2016, 8). This can explain the FB Team’s rather uncritically view on political communi-
cation on social media, the negative evaluation of the democratic performance of traditional 
media as well as the adaption of techno-optimistic narratives.  
Even though all interviewees think that social media can lead to an equalisation in the political 
arena, at least most of them see Facebook’s role in the public sphere in general as ambivalent. 
This is strikingly reflected when they are asked about the relationship between Facebook and 
democracy. Answers ranged from a prompt “I do not know.” (FT4) to describing the questions 
as a “very difficult question” without a “perfect answer” (FT5), “interesting question” and 
“complicated issue” (FT2) or “complicated and long question” (FT6). 
Most of all, the interviews show discomfort with Facebook’s role as a gatekeeper through its 
algorithms that control the visibility of content in the users’ news feeds. This is because the 
company regularly changes the algorithms, codes and interfaces of platform, which serve as a 
precondition for interactivity, to increase the sociality of its users with the objective to generate 
data (Villi & Matikainen 2016, 112f). The interviewees describe that a recent algorithm change 
                                               




increased the visibility of private profile pages in the news feed, resulting in a smaller space 
for political communication on Facebook. According to the FB Team, the platform’s demo-
cratic potential has therefore decreased. However, this statement most likely covers concerns 
about the FB Team’s ability to attract attention to the EP Facebook page. This demonstrates 
that in today’s commodified public discourse attention is indeed perceived as the “hard cur-
rency” for political actors (Aaagaard 2016, 7; see Ch. 3.2.1.).  
Moreover, several interviewees criticise that Facebook’s algorithms give more space to popu-
lism and anti-democratic propaganda that could level out democratically valuable information 
such as from the EP. In that context, especially Facebook’s filter bubbles are seen critically: 
I think it is also dangerous because as we have seen those simple messages seem to get 
the more attraction. The more simple and attractive for people you make it, the more 
people are going to listen to it. And the more you can show people that their best interest 
would be served in listening to you, they want to believe you, they want to listen to you. 
... They will think: “Well, yes, must be true, because all my peers agree with that person. 
I will too. (FT3) 
These critical accounts of the impact of social media on the public discourse show that the 
interviewees are indeed also aware about potential risks that derive from the decreasing power 
of traditional media in the public sphere. The facilitation of populism and extreme ideologies 
as well as the creation of filter bubbles leading to an isolated construction of knowledge and a 
fragmentation of the public debate have been confirmed in different studies (Awan 2016; Es-
senger et al. 2017; Jabubowicz 2018; Rader & Gray 2015; Silva et al. 2016; see Ch. 3.1.) 
Through this criticism, the collective optimistic stance towards technology is relativised. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, there are interpersonal discrepancies or disagreements concerning 
the risks of Facebook’s algorithms. The Head of Unit, who in general expresses the most opti-
mistic stance towards social media, refutes the critique of algorithmic power: 
Facebook and democracy – it is the same as the relationship between media and de-
mocracy: It is a place where people can express and debate and be informed. So, it is 
not a threat: I think it helps people to be confronted with different opinions. I do not 
believe in the bubble phenomenon at all.  
All interviewees however agree that communication on Facebook can have a lasting impact on 
our societies. Facebook is characterised as “powerful” (FT5; CFT), the platform as a “very 
strong tool” (FT2) to influence the public discourse. One interviewee points out Facebook’s 
impact in the US Presidential Election 2016, “If it was and is so important for the American 




The comparison with the US Presidential election is interesting because the influence of Face-
book was broadly perceived as negative, including the ideological polarisation through echo 
chambers (Spohr 2017, 155f), the prevalence of fake news (Silverman 2016) and the manipu-
lation of the pubic online discourse by bots (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, 212). Yet, the author 
uses it in a neutral way to describe Facebook’s growing role in the public discourse, implying 
that Facebook can also be powerful when used for democratic purposes. The statement hence 
entails a techno-deterministic notion, which assumes that technology is essentially neutral and 
its impacts on society depends how it is used (Hess 2015, 122).  
The techno-deterministic notion is not reflected in all but in most of the interviews. This can 
also explain why the interviewees ascribe the responsibility for Facebook’s impact on the so-
ciety – good or bad – to the citizens rather than to Facebook’s algorithmic business model: 
I think that we have to learn as users to be very careful about what we are reading on 
social media. That is important nowadays because we have proof that there are many 
fake news around that can give wrong impressions and information. They can affect, I 
mean really affect our lives, the way we are thinking and our attitudes towards very 
critical and important issues. (FT2) 
The obligation “to learn to be careful” indicates the viewpoint that users have the responsibility 
to use social media in a way that conforms with democracy – because “democracy has rules as 
all” (FT2). Those include “to check if it is true or not”, “to respect … other people” and “to not 
use social media for the wrong purposes” (FT2). The same interviewee adds that social media 
companies should put more effort into detecting and eliminating fake news, thus pleading for 
the self-regulation of the industry. At the same time, another interviewee does not show a lot 
of trust in Facebook’s will to design its platform in a more democratic way: “So I do not nec-
essarily see Facebook as the most democratic platform because in the end of the day it is still 
a commercial platform, a business” (FT3). Indeed, literature has shown that all Facebook’s 
affordances serve most of all its own interest (Hoffmann 2018, 202). As presented in Chapter 
3.1.1., together with other social media companies it has for example refused the introduction 
of regulations and user protection rights to secure its business model, which builds up on at-
tention maximisation (Apprich 2015, 139; Taplin 2017, 4).  
The interviews show that FB Team’s collective view on the communication platform Facebook 
is differentiated, including conflicting perception of its democratic potential. Most importantly, 
however, the FB Team members are aware of Facebook’s algorithmic business model and the 




Facebook as a tool – a pragmatic view 
Despite the perceived risks the platform Facebook might pose to the public discourse in gen-
eral, the FB Team’s notion of Facebook as a tool for the institutional communication is pre-
dominantly positive. However, the interviews entail two narratives of Facebook centring on 
this notion, which are used to justify different aspects of its use for institutional communication.  
The first narrative depicts Facebook as an opportunity. According to this narrative, in times of 
changing media consumption behaviour Facebook offers the possibility to enhance European 
democracy and to increase the voter turnout. This is because Facebook can help to provide 
citizens with information and offers unprecedented functions to motivate citizens to engage 
with its content, such as polls, graphics and videos. Through the network effect, information 
about the EP can be disseminated to a large audience. This includes people, who are not inter-
ested in the EU or politics, as well as those, who cannot afford newspapers. According to the 
interviews, with Facebook the FB Team is hence able to reach people that could not be reached 
through traditional media. Moreover, Facebook can connect citizens with civil servants and 
MEPs and empower citizens to execute their political power as constituency and voters. 
Next to this optimistic view of Facebook, the interviews display a second, more negative nar-
rative concerning Facebook: one of a space characterised by competition for attention and vis-
ibility. According to the Chair of the FB Team, Facebook “was a new development or an op-
portunity maybe back in the 2000s, I think now it is just one of the standard tools”. So, accord-
ing to the competition narrative, the shift in media consumption to social media and its rapid 
growth has rendered the presence on the platform into a necessary promotional tool for all 
public actors, including politicians, institutions, companies and even the media. 
While in 2009 the EP was one of the first political institution worldwide to join Facebook 
(Vesnic-Alujevic 2012a, 38f), today’s necessity to be on the platform has resulted in a compe-
tition for visibility, which the interviewees often describe with gaming vocabulary: The strug-
gle for attention is a “game” (HU; FT5) in which the algorithms are the “rules” (FT5) with 
which help to “compete” (FT3) and to “stay on top” (FT2). Facebook’s algorithms are hence 
interpreted as the key to success and the main directive of each communicative action. There-
fore, it is perceived as a nuisance that the company regularly changes its algorithms. Because 
the US company has power over the EP’s visibility on Facebook, the FB Team is, as the fol-




The differentiated view on Facebook as a working tool can explain the FB Team’s pragmatic 
attitude regarding the platform: Facebook is described as the “first big social network” (FT6) 
not only in general, but also for the EP, which makes it the “flagship of the social media plat-
forms” (HU). Today Facebook is still the most important social medium for the EP because it 
is the “best platform to reach the biggest number of citizens” (FT6). At the same time, Face-
book is seen as one of many social media companies. Its position is unstable and dependent on 
two factors: The first variable is changes to the platform’s algorithm. As mentioned above, a 
change that gives “less space to [public] pages and more to personal friends” (FT5) is perceived 
as decreasing Facebook’s relevance for the EP. Due to the large potential audience, however, 
there is a general willingness to adapt to different algorithm changes. Most of all, the benefit 
of Facebook for the FB Team is dependent on the second variable, media consumption behav-
iour of citizens. According to the interviewees, Facebook has been attracting more older peo-
ple, while younger people increasingly migrate from Facebook to the photo sharing platform 
Instagram, which makes Facebook less relevant in communication directed at young people. 
There is moreover a “tendency to go to more one-to-one communication platforms like 
WhatsApp or Snapchat” (FT4), further decreasing Facebook’s importance. The interviews re-
veal a pragmatic view on the FB Team’s own Facebook use:  
Facebook … is a tool. It is not the real world, it is not everything. It is not that every-
thing that happens on Facebook is the only reality … . No. Facebook is one of the 
many tools, a very strong tool, where we can express our opinions, where we can 
have a say, we can communicate easier, we can communicate our ideas as well to a 
big, big audience faster and easier. (FT2)  
 
All in all, the view on Facebook is highly differentiated: While it is seen as a means to access 
information and enter a political debate, the problems of Facebook for the social discourse in 
general are acknowledged. While according to one narrative, Facebook is an opportunity to 
interactively engage citizens with EP issues, the second narrative depicts Facebook as a chan-
nel of communication characterised by necessity, competition and dependency. The necessity 
to sustain a Facebook profile, the competition for visibility and dependence on algorithms. 
Thus, the take on Facebook is mostly instrumental: Its popularity makes its use necessary, but 
if its effectiveness as a communication channel to reach the target audiences shrinks, the com-
municators will concentrate their efforts on other platforms. While it is the most successful 
social media platform of the EP, the relationship to Facebook is characterised by pragmatism 
rather than a conviction for its deliberative potential or emotional attachment. The general de-




5.1.6. The Facebook Team – civil servants and communication experts 
According to the positioning triangle’s analytical framework, the positions of all actors are 
indefinitely linked (Harré & Maghaddam 2003, 9). Thus, based on the narrations concerning 
the EP, the media and public speakers, the citizens and Facebook, the position of the FB Team 
comes into being. Based on the aforementioned narratives, it can be concluded that the role of 
the FB Team is to replace or substitute the weak link created by the media between the EP and 
the EU citizens. In addition, the negative narratives concerning the EP put forward by journal-
ists and public speakers can now be countered in a direct communication with citizen on Face-
book. Necessarily, this communication is mediated by the platform provider’s algorithms. 
 
Figure 3: Positions of relevant actors in the public discourse and direction of influence 
Unsurprisingly, the interviews show that the most important source for the FB Team’s self-
positioning is their status as civil servants which makes the institution EP and the citizenry 
their two most important stakeholders. Thus, all interviewees believe that they have certain 
duties in terms of services to EU citizens, but also towards the EP. As to be expected, the 
responsibilities as civil servants in the communication of the EP entail those which according 
to the literature are commonly ascribed to Western institutional communication, such as fol-
lowing the principles of transparency, neutrality, objectivity, factuality and will thus not be 
discussed in detail. But while the role as EU civil servants is a static one and can only define 
the foundations – the opportunities and limitations – of the FT Team’s work, only the analysis 




Apart from civil servants, the FB Team defines itself as communication experts. This identifi-
cation is legitimate as all interviewees have a background in communication studies and most 
of them have worked in communication positions before joining the EP. This finding indicated 
a trend of professionalisation in the EP’s DG COMM as in 2004 a study on EP OPs displayed 
a lack of media competences and communication backgrounds in DG COMM (Anderson & 
McLeod 2004, 915). Another indicator is given by the amount of training the FB Team is given, 
which are next to “public speaking training“ (FT3) the following:  
We have training throughout the year: We had a video training for producing Facebook 
videos. I know that some of our colleagues were in Geneva last week for an Instagram 
training. We had other training sessions, for example we met a guy from Aljazeera in 
the autumn to discuss and exchange views to what Aljazeera is doing on Facebook and 
what we are doing on Facebook and we would meet people, I mean we have a relation-
ship with people, from all of the major platforms. (FT3) 
The promotional professionalisation of the EP’s Facebook communication is also reflected in 
the semantics used by the interviewees to describe their daily work. The marketing-driven ap-
proach to their work becomes clear when several interviewees describe their work with eco-
nomic terms. While a private company aims for “an increase in the purchase of goods or ser-
vices (…), [we are] trying to shift to a pro-European mindset” (FT3). An almost identical state-
ment is issued by another team member: “We all are trying to sell something. A private com-
pany is trying to sell a product, we are trying to sell ideas.” (FT5). The Chair of the FB Team 
offers a longer explanation for the comparison. 
We are not making any commercial profit. That is the difference between us and private 
companies. That is the only difference I think because we aim at more or less the same 
targets. We try to display our products in the easiest and most engaging way. They are 
selling products and we are selling the idea of the EP and voting in the elections. (CFT)  
The difference between corporate promotion and institutional promotion is hence reduced to 
the product that it sold. As the quotes show, the products the FB Team’s is promoting are 
support for the EU, awareness of the EP, and voting in the European elections. This makes 
clear that while the EP’s Facebook communication is not aimed at generating commercial 
profit, its objective is to mobilise power resources in form of votes and legitimacy. As presented 
in Chapter 3, institutional communication always aims to establish a narrative of legitimacy 
and mobilise support of the constituencies (Price 2012, 11; Valentini 2006, 81).  
With the expressed aim to commit Europeans to EU cause, the FB Team is clearly in charge of 




at informing and promoting the EU cause among citizens” (Valentini 2006, 80). The identifi-
cation as experts shows that the interviewees indeed identify themselves as “promotional in-
termediaries” (Davis 2013, 2) rather than just civil servants. The interviews hence vividly 
demonstrate the rise of promotional culture also in Europe’s political sphere.  
According to the Head of Unit, as with a corporate enterprise, promotional goals can be 
achieved through “work[ing] on the branding, the reputation and everything that is connected 
to branding, which is tonality, perception and so on” (HU). Unsurprisingly, the duties deriving 
from the FB Team’s status as civil servants, such as neutrality, objectivity and factuality (Val-
entini & Laursen 2014, 5), are often conceived as limitations or restrictions for the promotional 
communication. This is expressed through comparisons with private companies who are per-
ceived to have more freedom: “We do not sell shoes and we cannot twist the message as we 
want. We have to be clear and transparent” (FT6). Also, the quest for more creative freedom is 
explicitly expressed, for example through the request for an increased use of humour (FT3). 
The interviews show that the scope of action of the communication experts is restricted through 
institutional externalities as the administrative and political authorities have the power over the 
general strategic orientation of the institutional communication. These are referred to as ‘oth-
ers’, which expresses internal hierarchy: “When there are decisions made in this house, they 
listen [to us]” (FT5, own emphasis). The FB Team thus operates under a restricted autonomy 
and need to actively convince authorities to push through changes in the work procedures. A 
quote by the Head of Unit illustrates the limited influence over general questions:  
[T]he political authorities of the EP have decided that we should be pro-EU; we should 
be more in favour of the EU, not remain neutral because then we do not send the right 
signal, which is something we have been asking for years in this Unit, so we are really 
happy with that. (HU) 
While the administrative authorities from DG COMM such as Director-General Jaume Gauche 
are however depicted as benevolent, the interviews indicate the FB Team perceives the political 
authorities in a hostile way. As they additionally have the power over the budget and thus the 
resource distribution within the administration, they are even perceived as an existential threat 
to their work places: 
I think it [the social media training for the MEPs] is […] part of our offer and what 
makes us relevant as well inside the EP. Communications is in my opinion the first job 
where people make cuts because they think everyone can communicate and open their 




Again, the findings are similar to earlier findings, which found that the EP communication 
officials feel not sufficiently appreciated (Anderson & McLeod 2004, 910). Moreover, the 
quote shows, the performance pressure under which the FB Team operates: They need to prove 
its relevance to the political authorities in order to be sustained. Their success can be indirectly 
measured: “So we cannot show a spike in sales. We cannot even show a spike in voter turnout 
immediately, because the elections take place every five years” (FT3). 
In sum, the FB Team defines itself as a working group of communication experts whose task 
it is to promote the EP and the EU. The fact that the EU, as a whole, is included in the FB 
Team’s promotional activities differs from findings resulting from interviews with EP press 
officers in by Laursen and Valentini (2015, 36). They found that the EP officials exclusively 
work in the image of the citizen representation. This can be explained with the shift in the 
general outlook of DG COMM’s communication strategy mentioned above. The restricted 
scope of action due to the need to comply with normative standards of Western institutional 
communication together with the performance pressure within the institution can explain the 
economisation of the communication.  
 
5.1.7. Desired position – a publicly acknowledged European Parliament 
The positioning analysis has shown that the FB Team sees the EP as a powerful democratic 
actor. It is however misrepresented by the media and public speakers, leading to citizens’ lack 
of awareness and participation. The changing media consumption behaviour of the EU citizens 
has thus opened a window of opportunity for the EP to communicate the importance and ben-
efits of the EP to citizen and to bypass the reluctant intermediaries. Because Facebook is the 
most popular social media platform in Europe, it has been adapted as a communication plat-
form and a responsible working group in the unit WebComm was created. The FB Team iden-
tifies itself as communication experts. In their aim to convey a positive image of the EP and 
the EU to the public, they however underlie normative restrictions derived from their statuses 
as civil servants and a pressure to perform from within the institution.  
This leads to two conclusions in regard to the desired positions: The desired position for the 
EP is to be perceived as politically competent and beneficial for the EU citizens. The assump-
tion is that once public awareness about and a positive public image of the EP as well as a pro-




elections. It is the FB Team’s job to contribute to these goals. Because the desired positioning 
of the FB Team is to be perceived as relevant within the institution, it can be concluded that 
the FB Team’s objective is to promote the EP and the EU as efficiently as possible. With this 
in mind, in the next section the analysis of the Facebook campaign will be conducted.  
 
5.2. Speech act analysis 
According to the positioning triangle, after having defined the positioning of the relevant ac-
tors, the so-called speech acts, so actions, to reach the desired positions can be analysed. Each 
speech act is given meaning by a narrative, which offers a certain interpretation of the actions. 
The task of the researcher is to uncover the “illocutionary force” (James 2011, 102), the differ-
ence of what is being said and what is being done.  
In the following, the most important elements of the EP’s institutional communication will be 
analysed. With the goal to assess which democratic value the EP’s Facebook communication 
is having, the speech acts as well as alternative interpretation of the meanings are discussed.  
 
 
5.2.1. “Being where the people are” 
The first element of the EP’s communicative strategy on Facebook that was described in the 
interviews is the adaption of Facebook a communication channel. An interviewee explains, “ 
[c]ertain basics are always true with communication. Your starting point has to be the public: 
rather to know where they are rather than what you want to say” (FT2). According to the FB 
Team, citizens have moved from offline media to social media: 
How many average European citizens wherever they are from are just going to consult 
the press releases on the EP website? None of them will do that. That is why we have 
to be on social media. (FT4) 
Being on social media is hence “being where the people are” (HU; FT2). This phrase was 
repeated several times during the interviews, especially by the Head of Unit. It also appears on 
the EP’s webpage: “[w]e try not just to attract readers, but to be where the people are”.11 It can 
hence be perceived as the unofficial motto of the FB Team. A closer look at its components 
                                               





reveals the message it aims to convey. First, the verb “to be” illustrates the possibility to be in 
the same space at the same time, which allows for a connection between the EP and citizens. 
The verb also draws a line to traditional media where citizens cannot “be”; instead, they pas-
sively consume its content. The motto hence signals equality and gives the impression that the 
FB Team, representing the EP, communicate with citizens symmetrically. At the same time, 
the phrase implies that the civil servants are willing to adjust to the citizens: The team is the 
dependent variable, the citizens are the independent variable.  
As described in Chapter 3, orientation on the wishes of the target audience is common in to-
day’s promotional communication culture (Davis 2013, 21ff; Marwick & boyd 2010; Serazio 
2013). Moreover, Aagaard (2016, 8) claims promotional professionals often advocate horizon-
tal power relations, symmetrical communication and reflexive dialogue between the institu-
tions and the constituency through social media. However, the aim is to generate legitimacy 
for the institution, while asymmetrical power relations will stay the norm. That is indeed also 
the case for the EP’s FB Team will be discussed in more detail later. 
Facebook is important for the EP as it is the most popular network in Europe. According to one 
interviewee “the percentage of people not on Facebook is really small” (FT6), which is why 
the audience on Facebook is perceived as being more or less equal to EU citizens: The target 
audience is thus “everyone” (HU) or the “general public” (ibid). This differentiates Facebook 
from other social media such as Instagram and Snapchat, which have younger and more ho-
mogenous audiences. This view is shared by CEO Zuckerberg (as cited in Hoffmann et al. 
2018, 207), according to whom Facebook is for” people of all ages and all countries”. However, 
several interviewees remark that as younger audiences increasingly leave Facebook, its audi-
ence gets older. Nevertheless, Facebook is the most important social network site because at 
the moment it serves the FB Team to reach its target group. This becomes clear when the Head 
of Unit says: “We know that most of the voters are on Facebook” (HU). 
To conclude, the WebComm civil servants employ social media in general and Facebook in 
particular to reach Europeans through their favourite communication channels. At the same 
time, they justify the use with the possibility to directly connect with the citizens and com-
municate with them on one level. Until now, the analysis does not yet entail information how 
and if this possibility is used. What stands out, however, is that Facebook has not actively been 





5.2.2. “Informing the citizens” 
According to the interviews, the most important element of the FB Teams daily work is in-
forming citizens by creating transparency about the EP’s work on Facebook. It is often rea-
soned with the interviewees status as civil servants, which makes informing the citizens a duty.  
I think [social media] is becoming more important because when you are a political 
institution you represent people and you are funded by people, so you have to com-
municate with them. So, you have an obligation to explain your work and to show what 
you are doing. So, social media is important because how people get information is 
really important. (FT2) 
As the quote shows, it is thought that Facebook gives the EP communication officials a unique 
opportunity to adjust to the media consumption habits of the citizens and reach them with in-
formation. This is reasoned with the decreasing popularity of other communication channels 
such as the media or conventional websites. According to the Head of the Unit, Facebook is 
today’s main source of information because it “replaced the website (….) [and] became a point 
of reference for people” (HU). Thus, informing citizen on Facebook is part of the narrative that 
frames Facebook as a tool to enhance European democracy.  
Each post is aimed to present citizens with new information bringing “added value” to their 
lives (HU). The posts inform readers about legislation, the parliamentary schedule and the day-
to-day work of MEPs during the week and also on the weekends. On special occasions, posts 
can also touch upon affairs in the member states, for example the impairment of the rule of law 
in Poland or Hungary or the anniversary of the restoration of Latvia and Lithuania, and crisis 
events such as terrorist attacks. Each post includes a URL to more detailed information. 
According to the FB Team simply making information available is not enough to increase the 
citizens’ awareness about the EP. This is because on Facebook different organisations compete 
for attention, which results in an abundance of information in the citizens’ newsfeed. Hence, 
the FB Team needs to adjust its communication to the attention economy: First, the Facebook 
presence has to be active and up-to-date. One interviewee explains that “if you have a social 
media account you always have to be visible. People have to see there is updates, so that it is 
worth coming back” (FT2). Secondly, due to the perceived passivity and lack of interest of 
citizens, the FB Team needs to “sweeten the pill” (FT2). According to the Chair of the FB 
Team, marketing techniques are an important part of catching the attention of the uninterested 
audience, especially for topics with a lack of ability to attract attention or are “not very sexy”. 




editorial content such as cute, funny or emotive graphics, videos and polls. The FB Team also 
posts “a lot of animating content, just to sustain the community” (HU).  
That the EP Facebook page features funny graphics has been already recognised by Vesnic-
Alujevic (2012a). Her conclusion that these posts are primarily directed at young people is 
however incorrect since the FB Team specifically states that the Facebook users are increas-
ingly old. Instead, it is thought that the Facebook audience is less educated and wants “fun 
content” (FT4) while the audiences on the more political or business oriented social networks 
Twitter and LinkedIn are interested in detailed and complex issues (FT5; FT4). 
I see from the statistics of the organic posts that they do not really like to click [on the 
URL to more information] or do more. So, those who are interested will maybe click 
on the link, but I know that the key message will be in the post or in the video because 
the Facebook users do not really like to go further. (CFT) 
The quote shows that the URL to more detailed information mainly serves as a carrier medium 
for the promotional campaign to commit EU citizens to the EU cause. This is done by inform-
ing people in simple, short and appealing messages about the benefits of the EP and the EU. 
While the FB Team hence actively tries to sell a pro-EU mindset to the people, the obligation 
to inform citizens serves as a justification for all the promotional campaign. The campaign 
which is based on the use of funny graphics and content tailored to Facebook users’ needs can 
also be considered as part of the image management, which according to Valentini 2006 (83, 
88) is crucial to generate citizen support. It hence can be concluded that the narrative that 
frames Facebook as a communicative space where different public organisations compete for 
attention is used to justify the promotional campaign on the EP Facebook page. 
 
5.2.3. “Calling for action” 
 
The third speech act is engaging citizens online with the EP’s content, for example through 
inciting discussions. From the perspective of the normative theory of public sphere as well as 
from theories about the democratising power of the internet, the FB Team’s approach to the 
political pan-European discussion on the EP Facebook page is important. Even though the Fa-
cebook communication is first of all a promotional rather than an informational campaign, 
inciting a pan-European discussion amongst citizens could be assumed to be a part of such a 
campaign as it could foster a dialogue about European issues (Vesnic-Alujevic & Nacarino 




In regard to the EP Facebook page, the Chair of the FB Team states: “We are all about engage-
ment“. Indeed, every post contains a call for action which can vary from calling for indirect 
participation such as “like if you agree” as well as for direct participation such as “comment 
what you think”. The interviews show that inciting a pan-European discussion amongst the 
citizens on Facebook is not the aim of creating engagement. Instead, it is something that the 
FB Team “can use in different ways“ (CFT). 
The first strategic goal of creating engagement, as the interviews show, is the network effect 
which comes into being through Facebook algorithms: If users react to a post, the article 
spreads through their personal networks and reaches more citizens, including those who do not 
follow the EP yet and the FB Team “would not reach otherwise“ (FT5). 
(…) it is more valuable for me when they leave a comment or when they share the post 
with their friends. And shares and comments: First of all, we have the secondary audi-
ence that we gain through them interacting this way, because if they share their friends 
and family will see the post. The same happens when they comment. When it is a like, 
it is not so easy to get secondary audiences. (CFT) 
 
The analysis hence shows, the FB Team tries to accumulate its social capital by making use of 
the network effect or the “richer get richer”-effect (Apprich 2015, 133; Van Dijck 2013, 17): 
Through employing connective action, thus the personalised content sharing of its followers 
on Facebook, the FB Team can reduce the costs and coordination for achieving a public out-
reach (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, 748). Thereby it essentially exploits the people’s wish to 
express and share personal concerns, hope or ideologies in their personal networks (ibid, 743). 
Connective action also makes the message credible because it reaches people through their 
personal networks. As such, the credibility is different from for example paid advertisement by 
the institution itself. As mentioned earlier, the FB Team also works together with influencers, 
who volunteer as EP ambassadors (FT3). In that case too, the authenticity and the social capital 
of the opinion makers are commodified through the network effect.  
Both, distribution and credibility, are important to give the EP visibility in the competitive 
social media environment, which makes the network effect the central mechanism of the EP’s 
Facebook communication strategy. Hence, the FB Team employs a grass-root strategy com-
mon for institutional promotion with which the narratives disseminated with the posts can be 
spread all over the European networked public sphere on Facebook (Price 2012, 12; see Ch. 
3.2.2.). However, despite of gains in audience reach and credibility achieved through the net-




The discussions that take place on the EP Facebook page are valued by different interviewees 
to different degrees. For one interviewee for example, a discussion under an EP post has a 
normative value as it “implies that people are conscious of the world they live in and how they 
can change it” (FT3). Another one expresses the most scepticism about the deliberative value 
of the comment section:  
But let us be honest: If you look into our comment section, a lot of it is rubbish. I do 
not know if I should describe it as such, but it is. We see situations where you just have 
people commenting rubbish that is unrelated to the EP, its work or the post. (FT4) 
 
The FB Team’s ambivalent attitude towards online discussions contrasts the description of 
Facebook as a public space where everybody can have a say. The gap between theory and 
descriptive reality that the interviews reflect uncovers a contradiction between the impression 
of the EP Facebook page as a discursive page for political discussion and the economised, 
promotional approached to their communication.  
Instead of aiming to incite real deliberation amongst the citizens, the competition narrative is 
used to justify the quantitative approach to engagement which relies on the network effect to 
spread the EP’s posts through personal networks. The findings have shown that the FB Team 
is aware of Facebook’s algorithms and tries to avoid the “threat of invisibility” (Bucher 2012, 
1175) caused by a lack of interaction. It can hence be concluded that the main goal of the EP’s 
Facebook communication is raising awareness of the EP’s benefits and creating a positive im-
age of the institution through top-down communication while pan-European discussions but 
are mostly seen as a favourable by-product. 
 
5.2.4. “Offering a two-way communication channel” 
Social media companies, PR practitioners as well as some communication scholars argue that 
social media can connect citizens with political actors (Nielsen & Vaccari 2013, 2334; Davis 
2013, 22). According to this view, they “encourage politicians to listen to citizens and act eth-
ically” (Davis 2013, 22). However, the degree to which this connection that is established 
through institutional social media pages has an influence on the political decision-making pro-
cess is often unclear (Hennen 2016, 39). It is hence important to find out if the EP Facebook 
page is used to provide top-down information or to collect citizen feedback as a form of e-




Throughout the interviews, all interviewees stress that the EP Facebook page is a two-way 
channel. The notion, however, is used to refer to the direct information exchange taking place 
between the promotional intermediaries and citizens. When being asked about the political 
impact of the comment section of the EP Facebook page, the interviewees seem irritated: “We 
are not forwarding every single comment. To whom for example? To all the committees? No. 
This is up to them” (FT5). According to the Head of Unit, monitoring likes, shares and espe-
cially comments is one of the central benefits of social media communication: It allows you to 
“try to fit better the expectations“ and “to avoid bringing up subjects that nobody cares about 
because the context is not right“. Another interviewee confirms that “this is also a part of our 
strategy: It is not only about pushing the EP’s agenda, it is also about listening what matters in 
the daily life of the people and trying to show them that the EU is present in this as well” (FT5). 
Monitoring thus helps the FB Team to learn about people’s “daily preoccupations” (FT5) and 
create more content that is “interesting”, “useful” and “helpful” to the citizens (FT6). And “(..) 
it is part of what we have to communicate about the EP and what it is doing, so why not” (FT6). 
Topics from the EP agenda that “won’t work on the audience” (HU) are purposefully left out. 
Even though creating engagement in general is framed as a promotional tool to help the EP 
Facebook page compete for visibility, the monitoring of engagement is largely framed as an 
opportunity to improve European democracy. The argument that higher responsiveness helps 
improve the democratic public sphere by giving citizens exactly the information they need is 
prevalent especially in the promotional industry itself (Davis 2013, 22f). Again, the FB Team’s 
self-identification as experts respectively as promotional intermediaries becomes clear.  
From a promotional perspective, however, this adaption to the wishes of the audience has two 
crucial functions: First the data from the comments is used for a grassroots strategy to image 
management (Valentini 2006, 88). Calls such as “Tell us what you think!” are hence attempts 
to negotiate the values and actions that are presented to the public – not of the actual institution 
(ibid). Next to the number of interactions, citizens’ sentiments to different topics are important. 
Insights are used to evaluate both, the perception of certain topics and communication styles, 
and adapt them accordingly. The interviews hence show that the EP has professionalised its 
institutional communication in social media. Secondly, the goal is to offer subscribers content 
which they most likely interact with in order to profit from the network effect and generate 
user data that can be implemented in the image management. The findings hence show that the 




itself to draw attention to its Facebook page (Davies 2018, 637; see Ch. 3.1.1.). Naturally, also 
this political marketing strategy is justified with the competition-narrative. 
 
 
5.2.5. “Answering comments” 
According to the interviews, a part of hosting a two-way channel on the EP Facebook page is 
to reciprocally communicate with citizens. All interviewees stress that the FB Team regularly 
replies to comments, especially if the commentators ask questions about the EP.  
It is a chance for us to talk to real people. Sometimes you have people asking questions 
in the comments (…). And then you come with information, simply a link, something 
that does not take you the whole day, maybe 20 minutes to get information and then 
reply and then you realise by their reaction that they are really grateful and that you 
actually brought something to someone, over there in a country far away. And this is 
where the essence of the job takes all the substance. Then you realise: Okay, as a civil 
servant I have been really useful to someone today. That is great. (FT5) 
Due to the possibility of answering individual comments, Facebook is framed as an opportunity 
to connect with citizens from all over the EU and provide them with information about the EP. 
The interviewees stress, however, that their position as civil servants precludes them from dis-
cussing political questions on Facebook: “Political issues are for MEPs; we are civil servants, 
so we cannot say that this is good or bad, that is not our job” (FT2). Hence, replies to comments 
are limited to factual information about the EP: 
We will try to respond to as many as possible and basically when we see that we can 
respond with facts and figures from press releases, from an article, from a report from 
a committee, from a statement of a rapporteur to a comment we will respond for sure 
to this comment. (FT5) 
Instead, non-political comments that are complimenting the EP Facebook page are preferably 
answered to: “(…) sometimes we have nice and positive comments about our work and we 
always try to answer that” (FT6). The interviewee continues to explain that even if those do 
not ask questions, they would thank the author for the compliment (ibid). 
The FB Team perceives the EP Facebook page first of all as promotional top-down channel 
with the option for the citizen to directly communicate with the authors. Taken together with 
the ambivalent attitude towards the discussions amongst citizens, this finding makes clear that 
inciting political debates on the EP Facebook page is not the aim of the communication offi-




opinions about legislation of the followers, on a page is in essence political and promotes a 
political pro-EU message. In fact, the opaque nature of EU citizen consultancy platforms has 
previously been criticised (Tomkova 2010, 281f; Walter et al. 2010), with Hennen (2016, 33) 
warning that the lack of transparency could destroy even more trust in EU institutions. 
Replies to comments are moreover used as a tool in image management. The first one is the 
personalisation effect. One interviewee describes it as the following:  
When someone says: “I hate this and I think this is stupid”, sometimes I reply: “We are 
sorry to hear that”. And even that sometimes can make people go “Oh, there is someone 
there. I hurt someone’s feelings.” (…) It is really a bit more powerful than you think 
because people assume that just because you are publishing with a logo and not with 
your own name that you do not care, but if you post as yourself – if you reply and make 
sure that people know that there is someone there replying and reading these comments 
– it can already help to make sure that you get this kind of more human interaction. 
(FT3) 
Responsiveness should support the personalisation. As another interviewee highlights, the aim 
to “make sure that people feel that they are heard” (FT3), which according to Vesnic-Alujevic 
(2012a), is a necessary condition to lower political apathy. Research has shown that EU insti-
tutions have been notoriously perceived as impersonal (Meyer 2009, 1055). The image of the 
EP create on Facebook is hence aimed to counter that view: Through its funny graphics, inter-
esting topics and responsiveness, the EP is given a character. 
The promotional effect of replies to comments are however not only directed at individual 
citizens, but at the whole Facebook community. That is shown by the fact that inbox messages 
are dealt with by a bot. Moreover, Facebooks’ algorithms can be used to give favourable com-
ments a more prominent position in the comment feed:  
Because what Facebook does, it has top comments and if you as the poster react to 
comments, it automatically brings it up on top. So, with some trolls, the consideration 
is: Do you really want to make them visible by responding? (FT2) 
Instead, “nice or constructive comments (…) are liked by the EP itself and they are brought up 
as value to the conversation.” (HU). Again, the grassroots strategy employs the citizens’ agency 
for institutional promotion. The gate-keeping power of the FB Team can be regarded critically 
as they decide which comments are valuable. Moreover, they use authentic comments written 
by private persons to distort the public opinion. The authenticity is also used when it comes to 




sections: “And sometimes I just wait to hear if followers themselves will correct him because 
I think it is better than for me to do it” (FT2).  
To sum up, it can be established that the EP Facebook page is regarded as an interactive pro-
motional channel, which connects citizens and the promotional intermediaries. Comments are 
encouraged not for the purpose of political deliberation, but to serve three crucial functions for 
image management: First, they spread the post through the commentators’ networks. Secondly, 
they are used as evaluative benchmarks in image management. Thirdly, positive comments can 
be highlighted by moving them on top of the comment feed, which makes the public opinion 
in the public space on the EP Facebook page seem more favourable.  
 
5.2.6. “Being a bridge to the politicians” 
While the notion of the two-way channel refers to communication between the FB Team and 
citizens, the study participants stress that they are “a bridge” to the politicians: By connecting 
citizens with the MEPs, the citizens can exercise real political influence through bottom-up 
communication on Facebook. In this regard, Facebook is framed as a democratic opportunity 
as it bridges the gap between constituency and power and facilitates participation in the EU’s 
political decision-making process. The Head of the Unit expresses it as the following: 
We are here to inform so that the general public debates at least amongst itself. And 
then ideally a dialogue takes place with the institution or with a member of the institu-
tion, with a politician. We are just a bridge between the politicians and the citizens. We 
inform, so they have the elements to make a decision and have an opinion. We like the 
fact that they discuss amongst themselves, that is very interesting. But then rather than 
turning to us as an institution, they should turn to the politicians, which is why we 
organise those Facebook Lives and chats and try to valorise the work of the actors of 
this house because that is the real dialogue. (HU) 
 
To establish the contact between the EU citizens and the MEPs, FB employs four different 
means: First, they forward commenting citizens with political questions that they cannot an-
swer themselves to the webpages of the MEPs. The EP Facebook page features a section with 
links to the websites of all political groups and MEPs, although not very visibly. Proving this 
contact information is perceived as empowering the citizens, however, by enabling them, based 
on the provided information about the EP’s activities, to contact to the political decision-mak-




Secondly, the experts from the FB Team provide social media training to the MEPs. Such 
services are an established practice of DG COMM and also exist in the press unit (Anderson 
& McLeod 2004, 913). As established before, the FB Team sees the training as a main activity 
to stay relevant within the institution, which indicates that these services are more appreciated 
by the MEPs than the unit’s central campaigns. Again, this supports findings by Anderson and 
McLeod (2004, 902), according to which “[m]any MEPs see themselves very clearly as the 
primary communicators with the electorate, with [DG COMM] being required largely to act as 
a facilitator”. 
In the training for the MEPs, the FB Team members review the politicians’ individual Face-
book pages and suggest improvements. It is seen as part of connecting citizens with the politi-
cians, but also of raising the awareness of the EP in general and increasing voter turnout be-
cause while the EP already has a large audience, “a much bigger audience is actually the fol-
lowers of the individual accounts on social media of the MEPs” (FT3): 
The more people realise how the European institutions and politicians are important to 
their daily lives, to their actions, the more they will want to be involved in this, go to 
vote and have a say, the better will be their choices in the sense that they will be better 
informed. They will not simply vote for a name on the list, but for a programme, be-
cause they read it and correspond to what they want. I think it is our role to help MEPs 
to do this at its best because in the end it serves the interest of the citizens and that is 
what we are there for. (FT6) 
 
Despite the pro-EU orientation of the institutional communication, one interviewee noted that 
social media services are not only offered to pro-EU MEPs, but also to Eurosceptic or anti-EU 
members (FT3). This again can be reasoned with the normative obligations of civil servants to 
be politically neutral and is certainly valuable in term of public deliberation, in which different 
opinions should be present. 
Thirdly, the interviews reveal that occasionally the FB Team is asked by the EP’s parliamentary 
committees to monitor the sentiment of the comments to selected, but usually “big, controver-
sial” (FT4) topics. As examples, the interviewee mentions geo-blocking, which was an espe-
cially popular EP initiative, and an alleged kebab meat prohibition, which caused a public out-
rage (ibid). Another interviewee adds a parliamentary resolution on honey bees:  
It could be that tomorrow there is a vote on bees and it is super controversial and we 
are asked by the people in this house or even by the Head of Unit what the tendency is 
on this is in the general public so that they know the tone to adapt to. So, we would go 
through the comments and say: “In general people are in favour. What we realised is 




While monitoring comments certainly is an instance of bottom-up communication, it is ques-
tionable, if it has a political impact. With the stated goal of knowing which tone to adapt to, it 
seems more as a means of preparing crisis PR than collecting political input. 
Finally, the communicators organise Facebook Lives with MEPs. These are live video broad-
casted on Facebook and highlighted as part of the FB Teams work by almost all interviewees, 
indicating that the FB Team recognises these events as important. The format is one where the 
FB Team usually interviews individual MEPs while the citizens can post questions to the com-
ment sections. Those questions are picked up by the moderator and answered live by the MEP. 
During my study visit, on 22.02.2018, a 36 minutes long Facebook Live with MEP Ana Gomes 
dealing with tax avoidance and evasion was broadcasted. The interview is still available on the 
EP Facebook page today and received all in all 583.002 views and 590 comments.12 Facebook 
Lives are hence popular also amongst the EP’s Facebook community.  
From all of the activities that aim to connect the citizens with the European politicians, from a 
deliberatively perspective, Facebook Lives is most valuable as it connects politicians and citi-
zens in a reciprocal dialogue – even though the FB Team has the gatekeeping power of which 
questions will be discussed. Moreover, it is not clear if the citizens’ questions impact the poli-
ticians and how much the Facebook Lives are used by the MEPs as top-down information 
channel. Several interviewees express the wish to host more live interviews but point out the 
lack of available MEPs to participate in them. In addition, online comments that have not been 
picked up in the live videos are rarely answered. 
We also invite the members to come and answer the comments on our page, but they 
do not have time to do that. They do that more on Twitter than on Facebook. We have 
been telling them for years that if we publish an interview with them, people will com-
ment and maybe they have questions, so they should come back and answer the ques-
tions – but they do not do it. It does not fit their political time frame or so. (HU) 
The findings show a similar mindset of the MEPs as in Anderson and McLeod (2004, 912), 
which indicated that MEPs generally do not pay much attention to DG COMM and prefer to 
manage their own communication with their constituencies. 
In sum, the interviews show that “being a bridge” between citizens and political actors is 
thought of as using Facebook’s democratic potential best. Indeed, especially Facebook Lives 
                                               





can be considered as most democratically valuable in the EP’s Facebook communication. As 
there is no evidence about the political influence on the political decision-makers, however, in 
sum the citizen’s political impact though the EP Facebook page must be considered as small.  
For the lack of political impact of the EP Facebook page, once criticism would be that the EP’s 
official Facebook page does not promote direct contact to the MEPs more to empower the 
citizens. For example, instead of asking the citizens to give their opinions on the official EP 
page, their post could include calls to contact the local MEPs. That, however, would transfer 
internet traffic away from the EP page and contrast the aim to generate engagement. The cur-
rent calls for action could however be perceived as slightly deceiving since the commentators 
might be under the impression that their political opinions are valued.  
Moreover, it can be regarded critically that the FB Team does not attempt to expand the polit-
ical impact of its work, for example by collecting citizen feedback without request. Most of the 
time, however, even consistently expressed citizen concerns are not forwarded:  
It happens often that for good or for bad reasons people come on our page to express 
themselves about political difficulties, so if we think that there is enough substance in 
it, we try to inform the members. But it does not happen often – let us be honest. (HU) 
Topics that were forwarded concerned “the Syria situation” (HU) and an EP initiative concern-
ing stray dogs in Romania (ibid). In a similar instance, however, the comments are not for-
warded: “We just ignore it” (FT4). This becomes clear by the following exert:  
Sometimes we have campaigns against our comment sections. (…) And another exam-
ple is the Catalan referendum: After the referendum, at the end of last year, a lot of 
people from Catalonia were commenting about the referendum on all of our post. We 
may have had a post on tax avoidance or agriculture policy or climate change, but peo-
ple were on mass commenting on Catalonia. So, that happens as well. Another example: 
You have domestic issues that are really big in the individual member states. I know 
that at the moment homelessness is a huge issue in Ireland and you will see Irish people 
posting about homelessness regardless of what the post is. (FT4) 
As the quote shows, comments that do not match the topic of the FB Team’s post are perceived 
as campaigns against them. This is reasoned with the fact that these are domestic issues, which 
the EP has no competences in. However, it is likely that the citizens are not aware of that and 
turn to the EP because they consider it as having an influence on their national governments. 
Such political activism that reflects trust in and a positive image of the EP could be assumed 
to be valued more by the promotional intermediaries. This, however, shows that the bridge 




5.2.7. “Talking with Facebook” 
 
The final action in this analysis is the purchase of services from the social media company 
Facebook. The interviews reveal that next to paid advertisement, the FB Team’s civil servants 
pay for training by different social media company officials to improve their performance, with 
Facebook being one of them. During these, they are informed most of all about upcoming 
algorithm changes and how to adapt the content to them so that it receives the highest visibility. 
Moreover, they touch upon how to improve the targeting of paid advertisement and give in-
sights into the Facebook performance of other institutions.  
While the previous speech act stood most of all in the light of the democracy-narrative, the 
final speech act in the communication of the FB Team is fully part of the competition-narrative. 
It reasons professionalised promotion with the high competition for visibility and attention on 
social media in various ways: First, the narrative is used to justify paid advertisement as the 
following quote shows:  
(…) there is so little space left on social media and so many big people and companies 
are competing for it, so that you need a really well thought out paid strategy to make 
sure that you reach who you want to reach. (FT3)  
Moreover, as “[t]he world of technology and social media is growing and developing rapidly” 
(FT5), the team “is in regular contact with Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram and so on” (FT3). 
One interviewee tells that as a member of the Twitter team, he “would have been on the phone 
with people at the Twitter headquarters almost every week or multiple times a week” (FT1). 
According to the Head of Unit, it is “important to stay connected with the platforms to know 
what they are recommending, what the evolutions are and then we stay ahead of the game”. 
The FB Team’s strategy to gain visibility is to buy exclusive information about future algorithm 
changes from Facebook to anticipate the changes on the platforms and adapt their working 
methods to them. As the excerpt shows, Facebook’s algorithms have a direct impact on the 
allocation of financial resources within the unit WebComm: 
“When we found out that Facebook promotes videos more, [the Chair of the FB Team] 
was able to tell [Head of Unit]: “We need more videos in the Facebook format.” Be-
cause that again has more repercussions on the way that we work as a team, how much 
resources are allocated to it and how much money is going to video production. If we 
can say that our videos will not only go on the website, but we are also able to use them 




Staying ahead is hence accomplished with the purchase of exclusive information about future 
algorithm changes. It is this timely advantage that the civil servants are paying Facebook for 
because after the algorithm change been implemented, the information is available for free: 
“I mean in the internet they write about it, it is public information. But still it helps if 
you get the heads up from someone who is working for the company and tells you: 
“This is the stuff we are developing, this will be available in beta-testing in x months 
and then it will be made available.” (FT3)  
The interviews reveal that the close cooperation with Facebook has another advantage for the 
FB Team as the company has helped the EP during the last European elections in directing 
attention to the European elections. The Chair of the Facebook explains that Facebook does 
these kinds of campaigns without financial compensation to work on its own image, which has 
suffered from several fake news scandals and hence seems confident that the company will 
support the EP’s cause in the 2019 elections again: 
But Facebook as a company can also help and I hope they will help. Because what we 
do as the EP has limited power, but if Facebook does something as a company it has 
more power. In the previous elections, they had the ‘I voted’-button for everyone who 
participated in the voting and if they wanted to share it on their page, they activated this 
button. This had a way higher reach than we would have on the election day. (…) Let 
us see what they want to do for the [upcoming] European elections. (CFT) 
As the quote shows, the Chair ascribes the company Facebook a considerable influence on the 
voter turnout in the European elections. The close cooperation with Facebook and other social 
media companies is hence justified by the need for visibility in the main channel through which 
the European citizens supposedly receive their information. The findings support the normali-
sation hypothesis, according to which the internet will reproduce the unequal power distribu-
tion from the offline world. As a big tax-funded institution, the EP is able to buy information 
that is crucial for the success of the institutional promotion in advance and allocate its resources 
accordingly. Like this, it has a clear advantage in competing with other institutions that do not 
have these financial means. The competitive attitude is reflected in the fact that information 
about the performance of their competitors is included in the Facebook training. On behalf of 
the FB Team, it is perceived as “very useful for us to talk to people who are working with other 
institutions and compare ourselves to them” (FT3).  
Facebook’s business model, which is based on regular algorithm changes, has hence created a 
dependency of the EP on Facebook: In order for the EP to have more visibility and more attract 




willing to do so, not only because the company gains revenue through the training, but also 
because it has a genuine interest that the EP is creating user engagement on the platform – 
because as established in Chapter 3.1.1., “[i]n the Facebook assemblage, a useful individual is 
the one who participates, communicates and interacts” (Bucher 2012, 1175).  
From an ethical perspective, the transfer of the EU citizens’ tax money to Facebook can be 
critically discussed, especially considering past and presents conflicts between the company 
and the EU or single member states. The distrust of the EP in the company was expressed as 
shortly after the interviews, on 22. May 2018, three days before the EU’s new general data 
protection regulation (GDPR) came into force, Facebook CEO Zuckerberg was invited to the 
EP Conference of Presidents.13 There, he was questioned by MEPs and talked about hate 
speech and fake news on Facebook, the platform’s algorithms, the company’ data protection 
as well as its approach to competition and taxes, amongst others – all areas, in which Facebook 
has been criticised. One can assume that for the EP is concerned, especially given the manipu-
lation of the US Presidential elections through fake news, bots and the misuse of user data by 
the political marketing company Cambridge Analytica. The FB Team financially supporting 
Facebook is hence in essence unethical, even though it is justified by the need for visibility.  
On the other hand, during Zuckerberg’s questioning, the Facebook CEO also highlighted that 
protecting upcoming elections in European member states as well as for the European Parlia-
ment is one of his priorities. The EP administration can use that as another argument for its 
good relation to Facebook: While the political part of the EP critically scrutinises the company 
and builds up leverage, the FB Team negotiates the benefits that Facebook is willing to grant 
to the EP as a consequence, such as the “I voted”-button.  
In the past, several authors have pointed out that today public actors have to adapt their com-
munication to the operational parameters of social media platforms (Davis 2013, 196; Taplin 
2017, 17). Taken together, the findings support the critical theorist Allmer (2015, 20) who 
argues that “there is an asymmetrical relationship between economic, political, and cultural 
actors in the process of the technological movement of the productive forces with a predomi-
nant and powerful position of the economy”.  
                                               
13 Answers by Mark Zuckerberg, Founder and CEO of Facebook to the members of the EP Confer-






5.3. Story line analysis 
The research at hand asks for the FB Team’s sense-making of their work. Based on the analysis 
of its interpretation of different actors (positionings) and actions (speech acts), the narratives 
(story lines) can be grasped. The first narrative concerns the FB Team itself and gives its work 
a meaning. The second narrative justifies the FB Team’s work practices and communication 
on Facebook, in particular.  
 
5.3.1. Narrative 1: Empowering the citizens through information 
The main narrative that goes through all the interviews is that the FB Team enhances European 
democracy by empowering European citizens on Facebook through knowledge about the EP’s 
impact on their lives. In this way citizens become aware of the EP’s political competences and 
mobilise to act upon their democratic right and political power influencing the European deci-
sion-making process. This can be done by discussing European matters, contacting their MEPs 
and, most importantly, by participating in the European elections. 
The story line is consistent with the positioning of different actors: The EP, which is a powerful, 
democratic institution improving the lives of the citizens, is not acknowledged as such. The 
media and national governments are the villains who willingly deny citizens information for 
their own good, such as economic profit or scapegoating and need to be supplemented by the 
EP’s web communicators. The MEPs, who are reluctant to publicly act upon their role as Eu-
ropean citizen representative and do not understand the importance of professional communi-
cation, need to be supported as they communicate with their constituencies on behalf of the 
EP. The citizens, who are uninformed and passive, need to be actively approached with attrac-
tively designed information to be enlightened and empowered. Facebook, which is the favour-
ite medium of citizens, offers a chance to reach them and helps the communicators gain visi-
bility in a competitive space. The FB Team in its role as civil servants is fighting for the legit-
imacy of the EP and European democracy by acting as communication experts and successfully 
adapting to the citizens’ preferences and generating popular interest in the EP. Through their 





5.3.2. Narrative 2: Promotion for democracy  
As pointed out above, two sub-narratives are used to justify the communicative actions with 
either of them reasoning different aspects of each speech act. While actions that aim at empow-
ering citizens are often justified with a narrative that depicts Facebook as a democratic space, 
the analysis has shown that there is a strong promotional aspect in the Facebook campaign. 
This is mostly justified with a narrative revolving around competition for visibility on the 
online platform. 
According to the democracy narrative, Facebook is an opportunity for the civil servants to 
reach citizens, especially those who cannot be reached through the media anymore, engage 
them with the EP in interactive ways for example through videos, funny graphics and polls to 
inform them that way about the EP. Being able to adapt to the audience wishes is hence part of 
the narrative. Facebook can also be used to establish a direct dialogue between citizens and 
their MEPs through Facebook Live videos.  
The competition narrative says that in order to reach citizens and raise their awareness about 
the EP, political marketing techniques are needed in the competitive online space. Furthermore, 
in order to mobilise them to participate in the elections, the EP has to be presented in a positive 
light. Hence, the audience’s wishes and needs have to be monitored and adapted to – in terms 
of information that is made available, tonality and style. Moreover, interaction has to be gen-
erated to stay visible on the platform and spread the EP’s permanent campaign to secondary 
audiences, supplemented by paid advertisement. The narrative is also used to justify the most 
sensible part of the FB Team works, namely receiving training from and maintaining a good 
relationship with the company Facebook. 
Each action can hence be said to have a democratic and a promotional aspect, while in different 
actions either one of the aspects is more prevalent: In Facebook Lives with MEPs, for example, 
the democratic aspect is dominant, in creating engagement, monitoring as well as the cooper-
ation with Facebook, the promotional aspect is in the forefront. Adapting the communication 
to the wishes of the audience, however, is justified with both narratives to equal degrees. 
According to the interviews, the two narratives do not exclude each other. On the contrary, the 
competition-narrative is supplementing the democracy-narrative: Promotional strategies are 
used to enhance European democracy. Both narratives can be incorporated through the FB 




time. The analysis hence vividly shows how the promotional culture has manifested itself in 
the political sphere. 
 
5.4. Positioning type, purpose and goal  
After having conducted the positioning, speech act and narrative analysis, remaining three di-
mensions in the analytical framework for strategic communication, the campaign type, purpose 
and goal of the campaign, can be defined. First, the campaign type which defines if a campaign 
has been taken up deliberatively and defensively. Defensive campaigns are issued if “forces 
outside an organisation’s immediate control necessitate to position itself as [a certain] actor” 
(van Langenhove & James 2017, 13). As to the EP’s Facebook campaign, the findings include 
indicators for both. On the one hand, Facebook is also framed as an opportunity and the EP 
was one of the first political institutions worldwide to deliberatively adopt a Facebook page in 
2009. On the other hand, the analysis has shown that the low public awareness of the EP, the 
scarce media coverage, the critical assessment of the public speakers as well as the competition 
for attention amongst public and private organisation on Facebook are all used to reason the 
EP’s institutional Facebook communication. Most of all, however, the low voter turnout has 
made the institution vulnerable for criticism targeted at its legitimacy. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the EP’s Facebook campaign’s type is, at least today, is defensive.  
Secondly, the analysis has shown that the purpose of the campaign is self-promotion. Accord-
ing to James (2011, 104) “entities that use self-promotion want to be seen as competent and 
emphasize abilities and accomplishments.” This is clearly the case for the EP and its commu-
nication officials and even directly stated so: The campaign’s objective is to raise the awareness 
about the EP, improve its public perception and promote a pro-European mindset. The self-
promotion is moreover reflected in the campaign’s focus on past accomplishments, thus on the 
institution’s output legitimacy, in which is performs better than in the dimension of input le-
gitimacy. Furthermore, a pre-selection of the information takes place which leads to the FB 
Team presenting the audience favourable with information that it reacts positively to. The last 
dimension is the Facebook campaigns’ strategic goal (ibid, 105). The analysis has shown that 
while in the middle-term the strategic goal is to increase the EP’s public image, the long-term 
objective is to increase the voter turnout in the European elections, and that way, the institu-




Taken together, the analysis along the last three analytical dimensions in the positioning ap-
proach for strategic communication has shown that the EP’s Facebook campaign can be de-
scribed as a defensive self-promotion campaign with the goal to increase the EP’s legitimacy. 
In the last section of the analysis, this and previous findings are interpreted and critically dis-
cussed from the perspective of the European public sphere and deliberative democratic theory.  
 
5.5. Discussion: A promotional campaign with democratic potential 
The aim of this study is to offer a critical contribution by discussing the democratic value of 
the EP’s institutional communication on Facebook. From the viewpoint of deliberative demo-
cratic theory, the communication on the EP Facebook page has democratic potential because 
the page offers an inclusive space for all discussion participants, thus citizens and institutional 
actors, to debate as equals under the normative rules of reflexivity and rationality (Tomkova 
2010, 274). In a normatively strict reading, deliberation differs from debate in the sense that it 
must be able to change the initial position of a given actor (Ivic 2017, 83). Facebook’s delib-
erative potential can hence be used by the EP in two ways with varying ambitions: First, a two-
way communication between the institution and citizen can be initiated. For the communication 
to count as deliberation it has to have a policy impact, otherwise it is just a debate. Secondly, 
it can be used to incite an online deliberation or a debate amongst the citizens on the EP’s 
Facebook page, which eventually can foster a European participatory culture (Tomkova 2010, 
287).  
The analysis has shown that the EP’s institutional communication on Facebook is most of all 
a promotional campaign. Neither inciting a deliberation between the institution and the citizens 
or a deliberation between the citizens is explicitly aimed for. The main aim is to deliver infor-
mation. Because the Facebook audience is perceived as not suitable for in-depth information, 
instead the main purpose of the campaign is to raise the awareness about the EP amongst the 
citizens on Facebook and improve its public image. The political influence that the citizens can 
have through the EP Facebook page is minimal to non-existent. An exception are Facebook 
Lives interviews with MEPs broadcasted on the EP’s page, in which the citizens can directly 
communicate with political decision-makers. Regularly, however, the EP’s institutional com-




A two-way channel of communication thus does exist, but only between the citizens and the 
EP communication officials. Mobilising citizens to comment is part of the feedback-based pro-
motional strategy: On Facebook, likes, shares and comments spread the campaign through per-
sonal networks and improve the page’s relevance in regard to the algorithms. Moreover, they 
can be used to adapt the content and tonality of the institutional communication to the wishes 
of the audience. If a deliberation amongst the citizen in the comment section takes place, how-
ever, it is rather seen as a favourable by-product of the promotional campaign.  
As shown in Chapter 3.2.2., disseminating top-down messages through generating bottom-up 
communication is a common promotional strategy for political actors (Serazio 2013, 98). The 
findings hence confirm previous findings that Facebook users rather help political actors to 
achieve their promotional goals than working together with them on policies (Koc-Michalsk & 
Lilleker 2017, 1f). The EP’s Facebook posts’ calls for action, such as “Tell us what you think!” 
can be perceived as deceiving. The citizens might be under the impression that they are invited 
to a real deliberation with the political institution, which entails the notion that their political 
opinions are valued and registered (Ivic 2017, 83). In the words of Jenkins and Carpentier 
(2013, 271), they politically participate rather than interact. In reality, however, they join a 
“faux interactivity” (Koc-Michalsk & Lilleker 2017, 1) that supports the EP officials in their 
aim to spread the promotional message.  
The EP communicators seem to lack this perspective. For them, the apolitical interpretation of 
a two-way communication channel seems to be natural and obvious. Indeed, on the Facebook 
page, the team acts openly in its role as communication professionals: When answering com-
ments on Facebook, for example, they favourably thank compliments of their work. This can 
be explained by the FB Team’s self-positioning: Because the consensual perception is that the 
media do not fulfil their job as a Fourth Estate in Europe and cover the EP, the FB Team needs 
to substitute the lack of coverage. As such, the civil servants act on the intermediaries level 
rather than on the political level. The EP communication officials hence identify as promotional 
intermediaries (Davis 2013, 1). The motto “being where the people are” means to them com-
municating to the citizens as equals. The promotional communication taking place on the EP 
Facebook page is hence not perceived as top-down but as symmetrical communication. This 
narration, however, leaves out that the political message, hence the pro-EU message, is dis-




By substituting the media coverage, the civil servants see their role from the perspective of the 
European public sphere to offer citizens information about the EP. Interestingly, the analysis 
has shown that in the attempt to inform the public, the EP communication officials face the 
same restrictions as the media: The Facebook audience is perceived as neither informed nor 
interested enough to be presented in-depth information about the EP and the EU in general. 
While the media consequently simply reduce the EU coverage (de Vreese 2003), the EP web 
communicators reduce the campaign on Facebook to promotion based on colourful graphics 
and short, positive statements. On the elitist social media Twitter or LinkedIn, on the other 
hand, the EP’s communication campaigns are more informative and educational, containing 
in-depth information. Interestingly, this gap between media with different audiences mirrors 
the gap in the news coverage about the EU between quality and regional or local media. The 
analysis along the positioning triangle is hence able to show that the varying attitudes towards 
the EU in the citizenry is not only a consequence of the consumed information about Europe. 
Rather, next to the lack of news values, the initial disinterest in the complex EU politics of 
some citizens plays a crucial role in the lack of communication about the EU.  
Due to the promotional aspect, the information disseminated on the EP Facebook page must 
be regarded critically – despite the normative standards of objectivity, factuality and transpar-
ency the civil servants need to comply to: First, the Facebook campaign has a clear pro-EU 
outlook and thus carries a political message rather than neutral or objective information. Sec-
ondly, the feedback-based approach to image management results in a pre-selection of the in-
formation made available. Controversial and uninteresting topics are purposefully left out. 
While the FB Team, in accordance with representative of the promotional industries (Davis 
2013, 22), argues that such an audience-targeted approach increases the interest in European 
politics, it can be argued that it attempts to create legitimacy based on a twisted truth (Aronczky 
& Powers 2010, 11; Peter 2010, 5f). What the findings show is that the normative standards 
that civil servants need to comply define how information needs to be, namely factual and 
objective (Laursen & Valentini 2014, 5), but not what needs to be published.  
All in all, it can be concluded that the deliberative potential is largely not used by the EP’s 
Facebook team. The findings moreover demonstrate that for an informed public debate about 
European issues, critical scrutiny through trained journalists is essential (Sunstein 2017, 6f; 
Dahlgren 2018, 25). Social media communication, even when issued by democratic political 




democracy, do not necessarily exclude each other. Hennen (2016, 37) for example argues that 
even PR campaigns are a first step to create a European public sphere as they foster a pan-
European audience. Moreover, as much as the civil servants’ obligation to provide information 
about the EP to the public is a carrier medium for the pro-EU promotional campaign, the cam-
paign is a carrier medium for information about the EP to the public. Each Facebook post must 
also include a link with in-depth information – it is the choice of the citizens to consume this 
information if it reaches them through their Facebook feed. In general, however, informing the 
public about the EP’s political competencies and institutional agenda has the potential to mo-
bilise the citizens to take part in a broader public debate which can eventually impact the EU 
decision-making process. In addition to that, the EP Facebook page itself hosts sporadic delib-
erative instances such as most importantly the broadcasted live interviews with MEPs.  
Finally, the FB Team’s lacking aim to employ Facebook’s deliberative potential can be ex-
plained by the theoretical approach to democracy reflected in the interviews. As explained in 
Chapter 2, democratic theory has different traditions, with each of them ascribing the public 
sphere different function. This research has been embedded in the deliberative democratic tra-
dition, in which the procedure of deliberation with popular inclusion legitimises political ac-
tion. The approach to democracy reflected in the accounts of the EP communication officials 
on the other hand rather aligns with the liberal representative theoretical tradition.  
The representative perspective on democracy considers the citizens as the ultimate source of 
authority and assesses democracy through the degree to which interests, values and attitudes in 
society are represented in the government (Ferree et al. 2002, 290f). It is hence vote-centric, 
seeing elections as the central momentum of democracy. The public sphere’s most important 
function is to provide transparency about political actors’ and their actions. Information is pro-
vided by experts is to equip citizens for future voting decisions. Direct participation of the 
citizens in the public discourse is accepted but not actively encouraged (ibid).  
The representative approach to democracy seems to be characteristic for the EU’s institutional 
culture: Stie (2013) found that the EP performs better in its role as a democratic legislator from 
the vote-centric rather than the deliberative perspective. Ivic (2017, 84) concluded that the 
Commission’s Plan D for democracy, dialogue and debate (2005), officially aiming to include 
citizens in the European decision-making, “establishes a very limited concept of the public 
sphere, which is perceived ‘as an information-providing instrument’“. In fact, previous studies 




up influence on the political decision-making (Tomkova 2010; Just 2010; Kies et al. 2013). 
Moreover, Tomkova (2010) as well as Friedrich (2013) showed that the European Commis-
sion’s and EP’s consultations involved most of all pre-selected organised interest groups and 
experts, which also fits to the representative approach where only citizens with expertise are 
actively included in the public discourse (Ferree et al. 2002, 292). Finally, the representative 
democratic theory stipulates that political decision of the authority do not need critical discus-
sion after an election has taken place. In terms of legitimacy, it suffices “that a majority of 
legitimate, accountable representatives have decided on a particular policy” (Ferree et al. 2002, 
294). This study’s finding that the EP’s Facebook communication particularly focuses on 
demonstrating the EP’s benefits, and therefore its output legitimacy, fits well to this notion. 
The European public sphere has been understood in this thesis as the communicative infra-
structure to debate the legitimacy of the EU (Trenz 2009, 35). Considering this definition, it is 
questionable if the EP’s institutional communication aligning representative approach can con-
siderably contribute to establishing such a legitimising communicative space. Already the elit-
ist nature of the mass media’s EU news coverage, which rarely makes the citizens’ interests 
visible to the EU governmental actors, has been connected to the lack of citizen support in the 
EU (Walter 2017, 765). The EP’s institutional communication does not replace this missing 
link. While the EP’s top-down promotional campaign can probably mobilise additional voters 
at election time by raising awareness about the EP, the institution’s legitimacy crisis will most 
likely not be solved through a higher turn-out in 2019 alone. European elections take place 
only once every five years, but for the EU institutions to be perceived as legitimate and trusta-
ble institutions, it is important to foster a European participatory culture also apart from elec-
tion times. For that, European matters must be comprehensively discussed in the European 
public, before they are voted on by the parliamentarians. In short: the citizens need to be given 
real power in the EU decision-making process. If this is not the case, their perceptions of de-
mocracy will stay limited to the national context and the European democracy deficit is likely 







This study has explored how the European Parliament web communication officials make 
sense of the institutional communication on the official EP Facebook page. The starting point 
of the research was the European Union’s democratic deficit, which from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy can be explained with a lack of a European public sphere. For the EU 
governance’s legitimacy, a critical public deliberation guiding governmental action is neces-
sary. The question arising from the literature has been if the EP, hit by a decreasing voter 
turnout in the European elections, would make use of the deliberative potential of the social 
networking site Facebook and enter a dialogue with the European citizens to increase its legit-
imacy. The analysis was conducted based on data collected through participant observation in 
the EP’s Web Communication unit and interviews with eight communication officials. With 
the help of the positioning theory, it was scrutinised how the officials perceive their strategic 
communication on Facebook as well as their role in the construction of a European public 
sphere. The aim of the study has been to offer a critical evaluation of the EP’s institutional 
communication on Facebook based on the normative theory of deliberative public sphere. 
The research findings have shown that despite the EP’s legitimacy crisis, the EP officials 
largely do not make use of Facebook’s deliberative potential. Instead, they aim to raise public 
awareness about the EP and convey a positive image of the EP and the European integration. 
The final objective is to increase the voter turnout in upcoming European elections. The EP’s 
institutional communication on Facebook hence mainly serves the purpose of a promotional 
campaign. Even though the EP Facebook page occasionally connects EU citizens and the po-
litical authorities, the bottom-up communication from the citizens on the EP Facebook page 
has no systematic impact on the political decision-making process. Instead, it is used to im-
prove and to disseminate the promotional top-down campaign. The findings therefore support 
the view that the narrative of social media connecting political actors and the citizens in online 
dialogues is mainly put forward by institutional intermediaries to legitimise their political pro-
motion. 
The study has also shown that, from the viewpoint of the EP web communicators, promotion 
is a necessary means to strengthen European democracy. The perceived compatibility of pro-
motion and democratic communication is reasoned with the role the web communication offi-
cials claim from the perspective of the European public sphere: The EP web communicators 




citizens about the parliamentary agenda. The argument is that with this information, the citizens 
can – and should – make use of the power they have in the political decision-making process 
on the EU level. Discussions or implicit forms of engagement on the EP Facebook page are 
incited with the aim to spread the promotional information campaign. The perceived legitimacy 
of this practice reflects a liberal representative understanding of European democracy rather 
than a deliberative understanding: Citizens need to receive necessary information to make in-
formed decisions at election times; their participation in the public discourse on the other hand 
is not required.  
In part, the findings reflect previous studies, which suggest that the liberal representative ap-
proach to democracy is prevalent within the EU institutions (Ivic 2017; Stie 2013). This study 
adds to these findings by exploring the question more qualitatively. In fact, the EU’s web com-
municators’ perspective has not been broadly explored yet. The research at hand, however, has 
been able to show how important it is to consider the sense-making of the institutional com-
municators in research into the European public sphere. By offering knowledge about the mo-
tivations behind the EP’s Facebook communication, the qualitative findings can provide a basis 
for future qualitative and quantitative research on the social media communication of the EP.  
This research is limited because it is based on only eight interviews. Its findings can hence not 
be generalised. Future research should thus have a broader empirical base and should also take 
into account the use of other platforms. Moreover, Martins et al. (2012, 306) assert that focus-
ing on one institution is a crucial constraint in European public sphere research as it does not 
allow for conclusions about the differences between the EU institutions’ approaches to com-
munication. In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the motivation behind the EU 
social media communication, comparable qualitative interview studies in the web communica-
tion units of other EU institutions are needed. As the findings of this and previous studies 
suggest, that the MEPs see themselves as the main communicators to the European citizens, in 
further research also the political authorities’ stance towards the institutional communication 
should be considered. After all, for deliberation to be perceived as a communicative exchange 
with the power to change the participants’ initial stance on a topic, to take place through insti-
tutional social media communication, the cooperation of the MEPs and political committees is 
required. From another perspective, it would be interesting to explore between Facebook and 
European political institutions further. As the social media company currently stands under 




to show more social responsibility in the future. Thus, closer cooperation with democratic po-
litical institutions is likely to be sought after in the future.  
After all the criticism, the question remains open how the deliberative potential of social media 
could be exploited by the EP. Here, the normative deliberative theory of public sphere serves 
as a useful evaluative instrument to deduct suggestions regarding how the EP can improve its 
institutional communication. In my opinion, a first step could be to create transparency about 
the purpose of the EP Facebook page. The citizens should know that the EP Facebook page has 
no systematic political impact but is open as a discursive forum for those who want to discuss 
with others. Secondly, instead of the retrospective approach to communication focusing on the 
EP’s output legitimacy, it could inform citizens about parliamentary initiatives and agendas 
well in advance, so that they eventually still have time to contact their respective MEPs. 
Thirdly, and most ambitiously, the link between the web communicators and the political au-
thorities within the institution could be strengthened. Instead of monitoring Facebook com-
ments only upon request without the commentators’ knowledge, public consultations on se-
lected topics could be held openly. Giving citizens real influence in the political decision-mak-
ing process would not only generate internet traffic and engagement on the EP Facebook page, 
but also give the EP the chance to take a lead in how to use social media in innovative and 
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Interview questionnaire for semi-structured interviews* with members of the EP’s Web 
Communication unit (*Order of the questions could vary) 
1. Are you okay with the interview being recorded? 
2. Are you okay with your real name being used?  
3. Can you tell me something about your educational and professional background and for how 
long you have been a member of the Facebook Team?  
4. Which role does Facebook play for the communication of the European Parliament in com-
parison to the other social media platforms you use? 
5. Can you tell me something about the audience you aim to reach with Facebook?  
6. How often do you publish a Facebook post per day and why?  
7. Can you tell me about the content of the posts? How is the content chosen? 
8. How do you decide which articles will be published on Facebook and which, for example, 
are only published on Twitter?  
9. Which guidelines do you follow when you compose a Facebook post, for instance, in terms 
of style, length, language? 
10. Have you ever taken part in social media or Facebook training? What do you learn? Who 
are the instructors?  
11. Do you regularly conduct analyses of the published posts and the reactions they get on 
Facebook? If yes, how does the analysis look like and how do the results influence your 
work?  
12. How do you benefit from a high engagement on your Facebook page?  








14. Can you tell me something about this post?  
 





16. What do you think are the major differences between the Facebook communication of, let 
us say, a private company and the EP as a political institution?  
17. Can you tell me about your moderation policy?  
18. How do you decide to which comments you reply to and to which not?  
19. What happens with constructive comments? Do you monitor or forward them?  
20. How do you deal with the broad Euroscepticism displayed in the comment section?  
21. Do you reply to inbox messages? 
22. Can you tell me about your personal attitude towards the use of social media by political 
actors?  
23. What is your personal attitude towards the use of Facebook of the EP in particular?  
24. If you would need to order the following according to the priority of your work, what do 
you think is the most important aspect of the official EP Facebook page: Informing the 
citizens, sparking a discussion amongst the citizens or establishing interaction between the 
citizens and the EP? 
25. In your opinion, does your team use the EP Facebook page as a one-way communication 
channel or a two-way communication channel? 
26. How to you see the relationship between Facebook and democracy? 
27. Some critics say that the communication of the official EP Facebook page reaches only a 
small English-speaking elite. How do you think about this?  
28. Another point of criticism is that the discussions in the comment sections only take place 
amongst people who are already strongly pro- or anti-EU while people with moderate opin-
ions do not actively engage in online discussions. How do you think about this? 
29. What role do you think will Facebook play for the EP in the future, for instance in compar-
ison to Instagram and Twitter? 
30. In which relation do you see the communication on the official EP Facebook page to the 
upcoming European elections?   
31. You offer Facebook training to the MEPs. Can you tell me about the motivation behind 
this? 
32. Do you have anything else you would like to share to this study?  
